Can this Culture be Saved? Another Affirmative Action Baby Reflects on Religious Freedom (Review of The Culture of Disbelief, How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, by Stephen L. Carter) by Carter, W. Burlette
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
1995 
Can this Culture be Saved? Another Affirmative Action Baby 
Reflects on Religious Freedom (Review of The Culture of Disbelief, 
How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, by 
Stephen L. Carter) 
W. Burlette Carter 
George Washington University Law School, bcarter@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
W. Burlette Carter, Can this Culture be Saved? Another Affirmative Action Baby Reflects on Religious 
Freedom (Review of The Culture of Disbelief, How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious 
Devotion, by Stephen L. Carter), 95 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1995). 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
CAN THIS CULTURE BE SAVED? ANOTHER AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION BABY REFLECTS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLI- 
TICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION. By Stephen L. Carter. New 
York: Basic Books, 1993. Pp. 328. $25.00. 
W Burlette Carter* 
Trading on a number of attractive myths, in the fall of 1993, Stephen 
Carter' produced one of the more celebrated books written by a law pro- 
fessor in recent memory. In The Culture of Disbelief, Carter charges the 
American legal and political culture with trivializing religious devotion to 
such an extent that today, religion is not an acceptable subject of discus- 
sion in public fora.2 Accordingly, says Carter, religious discourse is dis- 
couraged in public discussions while other types of discourse are wel- 
comed, and religious behavior in public life is viewed as suspect because it 
is religious. 
The award-winning book generated a virtual cottage industry of news 
articles and other media coverage on its subject.3 Shortly after Culture's 
* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University National Law 
Center, B.A. Agnes Scott College, 1982; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1985. I thank my 
colleagues Paul Butler, Brad Clark, Ira Lupu (special thanks), Larry Mitchell, and Robert 
Tuttle who reviewed early drafts of this Review essay and provided helpful comments. I 
also thank Dean Jack Friedenthal for his support, Professors Ronald Collins and Susan 
Gilles for their insightful comments on an early draft, and Philip Davis for his help with 
religious sources. Finally, I thank research assistants Carol Lillienstein and RobertJenkins, 
who provided primary assistance with this work, as well as research assistants Mamaye 
Makalou and James Hwa for their contributions. 
(The author of this piece is not related to Stephen Carter.) 
1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. Carter is also the 
author of Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (1991). 
2. Some of the basic themes Carter trumpets in Culture have been previously explored 
by him in other publications and speeches. He notes in his acknowledgements two articles 
in particular: Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 Duke 
L.J. 977 (pp. vi, vii); The Inaugural Development Fund Lectures: Scientific Liberalism, 
Scientistic Law, 69 Or. L. Rev. 471 (1990). See also Stephen L. Carter, The Separation of 
Church and Self, 46 SMU L. Rev. 585 (1992) (arguing that liberal political theory's image 
of ideal public citizen fails to preserve place for religious expressions); Stephen L. Carter, 
Religion Doesn't Have a Prayer, Legal Times, July 23, 1990, at 28 (arguing that, according 
to courts, the Establishment Clause mandates that "God's word may not be taken seriously 
in public affairs"). Because Culture's primary readership-the general public-does not 
have the benefit of Carter's prior works, and because Carter himself describes these earlier 
explorations as part of an "intellectual odyssey" (p. vi) (thus suggesting that Culture 
represents the most current manifestation of his views), my comments here are based 
solely upon Culture of Disbelief unless otherwise stated. In making these comments, I take 
into account the fact that a book for the general public does not lend itself to the same 
degree of thoroughness allowable in a law review publication. 
3. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Conservatives' Faith, Liberals' Disdain, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 15, 1993, ? 4, at 15 (book excerpt); Stephen L. Carter, Is God Just A Hobby?, Atlanta 
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release, political and religious leaders across the country took to citing it 
from platforms or waving it from pulpits. Indeed, President Clinton pub- 
licly praised Culture as recommended reading4 and chose to have himself 
depicted in a portrait holding a copy of the book.5 Culture was widely 
acclaimed as a significant contribution to our understanding of religion 
in America.6 With few exceptions,7 the public responses to the book were 
positive. 
This Review is more critical of Culture's approach. I contend that 
Culture's trivialization thesis lacks support and is inherently defective as a 
starting point from which to fashion a workable theory of freedom to 
engage in public religion. I argue that Culture's approach does not ade- 
quately consider minority group religious freedom rights. Moreover, it 
yields to the inevitable search for audience appeal, Culture nds up trivial- 
izing the very religious concerns that it set out to highlight. 
Part I provides a basic outline of the trivialization theory. Part II 
examines some of the evidence that Carter presents to support this thesis, 
focusing primarily on his argument that the law trivializes religion. There 
I argue that Culture xaggerates the examples of alleged trivialization that 
it provides. Relying heavily upon overstatement, Culture perpetuates a 
mythology of oppression and undermines its primary objective of estab- 
lishing that religious points of view should be taken seriously in public 
debates. 
Const., Oct. 17, 1993, at GI, G3 (book excerpt); Joel Chineson, Do You Believe in God- 
Talk?, Legal Times, Feb. 21, 1994, at 50; Joel Chineson, The Politics of Enlightenment, 
Am. Law., May 1994, at 46. 
4. See, e.g., David Lauter, Clinton Voices Concern U.S. May Be Too Secular, L.A. 
Times, Aug. 31, 1993, at Al, A4; Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1993, at 8. 
Both the President and Mrs. Clinton are mentioned favorably in Culture (pp. 4-5, 19, 265). 
5. This fact is noted by Sanford Levinson in his review of Culture. See Sanford 
Levinson, The Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1873, 1873 n.3 (1994) 
(citing David Bollier, Who "Owns" the Life of the Spirit?, Tikkun, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 29). 
6. In June of 1994, Carter was awarded the Louisville Grawemeyer Award in Religion 
for Culture. He was reportedly the first nontheologian to win the prestigious award. See 
Judith L. Howard, Stephen L. Carter, Dallas Morning News, June 12, 1994, at 1J. The 
following month the American Bar Association awarded a Certificate of Merit recognizing 
Culture as making a noteworthy contribution to public understanding of the American 
legal system. See ABA Announces Media Winners in Gavel Awards Competition, P.R. 
Newswire, July 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
7. Among the rare early dissenters was Michael Kinsley. See Michael Kinsley, Martyr 
Complex, The New Republic, Sept. 13, 1993, at 4. Slower paced legal scholarship has 
yielded some additional critiques that vary in their degree of dissent. See, e.g., Scott C. 
Idelman, The Sacred, the Profane, and the Instrumental: Valuing Religion in the Culture 
of Disbelief, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1313, 1316, 1348-52 (1994) (agreeing with much of 
Carter's observations, but arguing that Carter's theory of government-religion relations 
would reduce religious liberty to a mere tool of society); Levinson, supra note 5, at 
1876-81 (inter alia, describing Carter's own arguments as made in secular language and 
disputing that secular listeners should or could accept a religious mode of argument); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, God as a Lobby, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1655 (1994) (Carter's arguments 
for religious autonomy necessarily conflict with arguments favoring religion in public life). 
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Part III discusses how Culture's approach trivializes the concerns of 
religions and cultures outside the mainstream. In the first section of Part 
III, I argue that while Culture purports to represent the interests of all 
religions and to seek the best interests of all Americans, in fact faiths and 
cultures outside the mainstream are shortchanged in its analysis. Culture 
considers its theme solely from the perspective of majority religions and 
cultures, even when it purports to address minority concerns. Adopting 
this perspective, Culture minimizes the impact of race and culture on reli- 
gious freedom debates and minimizes the need for the law to play the 
role of mediator between majority and minority religions. In the second 
section of Part III, I demonstrate that Culture expressly trivializes specific 
religious expressions that are outside the mainstream. There I discuss 
Culture's passing reference to liberation theology and its discussion of 
political preaching, and I show that Culture itself rejects religious dis- 
course that is inconsistent with its author's own theological and political 
assumptions, even as it argues for a broader embrace of religious 
discourse. 
Part IV argues that the attitude that Carter describes as our culture's 
approach to "religion" instead reflects our general approach to perspec- 
tives that are not those of the relevant majority. I argue that Culture itself 
falls prey to our cultural tendency to assume that the majority's perspec- 
tive reflects the perspective of all groups within the culture, i.e., what 
holds true for the religious majority must be true for other groups as well. 
The result of such erroneous assumptions is that the concerns of those 
outside the majority are trivialized. Culture's analytical approach fails to 
recognize this problem, and in the end, in blaming the "culture" for our 
own "disbelief," Culture advocates a definition of religious faithfulness 
and religious freedom that is a dangerous embrace for those who purport 
to take law or religion seriously. 
I. THE TRIVALIzATION THESIS 
Religiosity, according to Stephen Carter, is resurgent in America and 
indeed has always been a strong part of American life (pp. 4, 8, 15, 20, 
186-87). But today, he claims in Culture, persons who proclaim their 
faith by word or deed in the public square8 are subject to criticism, ridi- 
cule, and embarrassment, or they simply are not taken seriously. 
Culture applauds the principle of the separation of church and state 
(p. 3). But it argues that we have taken the concept of separation too far 
and have created a society that "exerts pressure to treat religion as a 
hobby," discouraging the faithful from engaging in "God-talk"-public 
discussion in explicitly religious terms-and from following the rules of 
their faith if those rules require behavior that secular society considers 
8. Carter defines "public square" for his readers as "the arena in which our public 
moral and political battles are fought" (p. 51). 
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objectionable (p. 29).9 Even within the acceptable mainstream, argues 
Carter, Americans seem most comfortable with those who limit their reli- 
gious observances to a few sessions of private worship and prayer but who 
are "too secularized to let their faiths influence the rest of the week" (p. 
29).10 Carter notes that this discomfort with expressly religious discourse 
is heightened when the faithful not only refuse to keep quiet about their 
beliefs, but also act on belief in ways contrary to the dictates of secular 
society (pp. 8, 29). 
Carter claims that American culture treats religion as an inferior ba- 
sis for decisionmaking in the public arena (pp. 15, 16). In this "Culture 
of Disbelief," the selective rejection of religiously-based opinions occurs 
not because of the listener's disagreement with the cause espoused, but 
rather because the religiously-based viewpoint is not viewed as rational. 
He claims that American culture, buttressed by liberal political theory,"1 
has made rationality a nonnegotiable prerequisite for discourse in the 
public square (pp. 42-43, 54-56).12 But this requirement ignores the 
9. Carter defines religion as a "tradition of group worship (as against individual 
metaphysic) that presupposes the existence of a sentience beyond the human and capable 
of acting outside of the observed principles and limits of natural science, and, further, a 
tradition that makes demands of some kind on its adherents" (p. 17). Carter expressly 
recognizes that some will criticize his definition of religion as underinclusive (p. 18). 
10. Carter uses the terms "mainstream" and "mainline" to refer to Protestant, 
Catholic, andJewish religious traditions. In context, the term appears to connote a degree 
of political acceptance and political power (e.g., p. 29-32). I will use the term to refer to 
white Protestants and Catholics only, unless otherwise noted. I think that his inclusion of 
Judaism, while in some sense understandable, is subject too many conditions and, as I will 
explain later, cultural minorities who are Christian often have traditions that significantly 
distinguish them from majority Christians. For lack of a better term, I will use the term 
"minority" to refer to faiths outside the mainstream and "minority cultures" to refer to 
racial groups comprising persons of color. 
11. Carter uses the term "liberalism" to denote "the philosophical tradition that 
undergirds the Western ideal of political democracy and individual liberty". He notes that 
conservatives as well as liberals often claim to represent the "liberal" tradition. 
Occasionally, he also uses the word liberal in its contemporary political sense, but he relies 
upon the context to indicate this use (p. 55 n.*). 
12. Carter criticizes theorists who argue that individuals should attempt to justify their 
political choices in terms of rational speech rather than appeals to morality. See, e.g., 
Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. Phil. 5, 16-18 (1989) (cited at pp. 54-56). 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, another critic of the trend, has explained the point in a helpful 
way. He says that underlying liberal political theory is the Lockean notion that there exist 
(1) an inviolable private sphere of individual rights that government cannot touch and that 
is freely subject to both rational thought and passion, and (2) a public sphere controlled 
by government which, because it must balance the various and sometimes conflicting 
interests, must rely solely on rational thought in attempting to reach a common good. 
Under this view, "rational" discourse is necessary in the public sphere, in order that 
government remain "neutral" in its decisionmaking. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life 
and Hostility to Religion, 78 Va. L. Rev. 671, 674-76 (1992); see also MichaelJ. Perry, Love 
and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics 10, 15 (1991) (arguing 
that approaches excluding religious dialogue are not neutral and that the only truly 
neutral/impartial practice of political justification is to let everyone rely upon their 
relevant convictions) (cited at p. 56). The complaint that religion is improperly shut out 
1995] RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 477 
fact that religion is, by definition, a different way of knowing the world 
(p. 43).13 According to Culture, despite the fact that religious reasoning 
may differ from secular reasoning, religious reasoning ought to be 
respected as an acceptable form of public discourse (pp. 42-43, 
230-36). 14 
In making its case for more respect for religion, Culture advances the 
familiar but controversial point that the original purpose behind the Es- 
tablishment and Free Exercise Clauses contained in the First Amend- 
mentl5 was to protect religion from government, not to protect govern- 
ment from religion (pp. 105-06, 115-20).16 Culture thus takes on those 
of the public arena has been echoed by scholars who also argue for greater public 
accommodation of religious activities. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious 
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 126 (1992). Others argue that these 
accommodationists place too little weight on the Establishment Clause and erroneously 
focus primarily upon the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with 
Accommodation, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 743, 747-48 (1992) (pro-accommodationists 
frequently collapse the two religion clauses but Establishment Clause must be given its 
due); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195, 197 
(1992) (Establishment Clause operates to end the war between the sects as part of a social 
contract) . 
13. Carter points out that for the religious person, what some might see as irrational 
passion is in fact rational behavior by the standards of the religion (p. 217). 
14. Carter says that "toleration" of religious viewpoints is not enough. Using 
Christianity's relationship to other faiths as an example, he argues, "Tolerance without 
respect means little; if I tolerate you but do not respect you, the message of my tolerance 
... is that it is my forbearance, not your right, and certainly not the nation's commitment to 
equality, that frees you to practice your religion" (p. 93; see also p. 230). It could be 
argued that Carter's separation of the idea of tolerance from the idea of respect is 
inconsistent with the concept of tolerance in some liberal political theory. See, e.g., John 
Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 211-21 (1971) (tolerance emerges from the concept ofjustice as 
fairness and is necessitated by the principle of equality). To the extent that by "respect" 
Carter means an acknowledgement of the inherent validity of the religious point of view, 
Carter also may be asking secularists to do the impossible. Responding to Carter, Sanford 
Levinson has commented that a secularist cannot accept the argument that "God requires 
X"; indeed, it is the rejection of that very approach that makes the person a secularist. 
Levinson, supra note 5, at 1879. 
15. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I. 
16. But see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law ? 14-3, at 1158-59 
(2d ed. 1988) (comparing views of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Roger Williams, 
and arguing that history of the religion clauses reflects not one but three views: (1) 
concern that religion must be protected from corruption by government (Williams); (2) 
concern that government and private secular interests must be protected from corruption 
by religion Jefferson); and (3) concern that both religion and government would be best 
advanced through separation (Madison)); see also Arlin M. Adams & CharlesJ. Emmerich, 
A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty: The Constitutional Heritage of the Religion 
Clauses 21-31 (1990) (identifying three different approaches and stating that "[a]ny 
attempt to reduce the Founders' views to one position or to read the beliefs of certain 
Founders, no matter how prominent, into the First Amendment is apt to produce 
indefensible and culturally unacceptable results"). While Carter offers a passing reference 
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who wish to equate religious speech with other speech. It argues that 
religious devotion is not just ordinary speech under the First Amend- 
ment, nor are religiously-based actions just another matter of conscience 
(pp. 130-32). According to Carter, religion matters to adherents in ways 
that other speech and other matters of conscience do not, and, in his 
view, the religion clauses provide for unique protections (p. 35).17 
Additionally, Culture claims that religiously-informed viewpoints help 
preserve democracy in society. Citing de Tocqueville and others, Carter 
argues that "the very aspect of religions that many of their critics most 
fear-that the religiously devout, in the name of their faith, take posi- 
tions that differ from approved state policy-is one of their strengths" (p. 
37). In our pluralistic society, Carter says, the religions act against the 
threat of tyranny by offering alternative sources of moral understanding, 
and by splitting off the allegiances of citizens, pressing them toward views 
that differ from those of the state (pp. 35-37).18 
Culture also stresses the need for the religions to maintain their au- 
tonomy from the state. It warns that through increasing reliance upon 
the state's largess, the religions threaten their independence, and thus, 
the essential freedom of each religion to determine the content of its own 
theology.19 
to some dissent on the issue of Jefferson's views, ("[s]ome scholars argue that Jefferson 
believed that religion had no role in government" (p. 117)), he discounts such dissent 
quickly and proceeds to recount the history of the religion clauses as if there can be no 
serious debate about his point, and even refers to that history as "unambiguous" (p. 119). 
17. Carter's concern hearkens to an ongoing debate in academia over what 
accommodations government should make for religious speech. Carter sides with 
accommodationists who favor broad governmental support and encouragement of 
religious expressions in the public sphere. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 12, at 126. At 
the other end of the spectrum are those who claim that the Constitution requires that the 
state neither encourage nor condemn religious speech. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 12, at 
771-81; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 202-08. As Carter notes, some religious persons 
respond that the latter approach, sometimes referred to as "neutrality" to religion, is 
actually hostility toward religion (p. 51), and some even claim the approach indeed serves 
to promote state-chosen "religions" such as secular humanism. See, e.g., Homer Duncan, 
Secular Humanism: The Most Dangerous Religion in America (1979). Carter says that he 
does not subscribe to the hostility thesis but says he understands why religious people 
might see it that way (p. 52). 
18. See, e.g., Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 295, 291 (George 
Lawrence trans., 1969). 
19. Carter discusses BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), in which 
the Supreme Court held that the Internal Revenue Service could withhold tax-exempt 
status from educational institutions that discriminate on the basis of race. Bob Jones 
University unsuccessfully claimed a right to a religious exemption from the relevant IRS 
regulations (pp. 150-51). Carter states that 
[o]ne must be careful ... not to be so blinded by the immorality of racism that 
one misses the glaring problem for the religions that the BobJones case illustrates. 
By accepting the offer of special tax treatment, the religions themselves may have 
paved the way for a future in which they are told that they will lose their treasured 
tax status unless they reflect, in theology and practices, whatever the current 
government policy might be .... (Pp. 151-52.) 
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Culture rejects the notion that the presence of lively religious rheto- 
ric in the political arena is evidence that public religious discourse is alive 
and well (pp. 44_45).20 Rather, it dismisses this "civil religion," chiding 
those across the political spectrum who "treat Holy Scripture like a dic- 
tionary of familiar quotations" (p. 45).21 Practitioners of civil religion, 
says Carter, erroneously use God-talk to argue that God supports one or 
another political cause (pp. 45, 51-52).22 But Carter states that he is 
equally offended by suggestions that God-talk has no place in public dis- 
cussions (p. 48). 
While in much of Culture he defends religious speech, in a chapter 
entitled "Political Preaching," Carter launches an attack against some of 
the faithful whom he says also trivialize religion. Thus, Culture condemns 
"political preachers" who, in Carter's view, improperly attempt to use reli- 
gion to bend their flocks to adopt certain political points of view. Culture 
argues that when politics and theology are always in sync, one has reason 
to suspect the validity of the theology (pp. 67-82). According to Carter, 
then, political preachers are not much different from the practitioners of 
civil religion (p. 81). 
Culture asserts that the denigration of public religious discourse that 
we are now witnessing is a relatively new phenomenon, at least among 
liberals who, he claims, embraced religious rhetoric as a part of the social 
gospel. Culture thus argues that the openly religious rhetoric that charac- 
terized the Civil Rights Movement presents a "dilemma" for liberals and 
liberal philosophers who now complain when conservatives engage in 
God-talk (pp. 19, 227).23 According to Carter, "liberal philosophy's dis- 
taste for explicit religious argument ... cannot accommodate the openly 
20. Kathleen Sullivan has stated that, although such evidence is not alone conclusive, 
it suggests that "if the Court was in the business of wholesale secularization, it has not 
succeeded." Sullivan, supra note 12, at 196. 
21. Here Carter embraces, see p. 51, Frederick Mark Gedicks's definition of civil 
religion: "the utterance of 'faintly protestant platitudes which reaffirm the religious base of 
American culture despite being largely void of theological significance.'" Frederick M. 
Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 113, 122 
(1991). 
22. For example, he notes President George Bush's 1992 State of the Union Message 
in which Bush stated that "by the grace of God, America won the cold war" (p. 45). Carter 
analyzes the line in this way: 
With these five short words, a politician conveys the sense of a people specially 
favored by the Almighty-quite flattering to one's constituents. At the same time, 
one wraps the mantle of godliness around one's policies. The message is not only 
that our faith in God helped us, but that God is on our side. We won the cold war 
not simply by God's grace, but by God's will; we won not only because God was 
with us, but, in effect, because God is one of us. The message, at bottom, is that 
God is an American-and maybe even a Republican. (P. 45.) 
23. From the context, it appears that Carter intends the word "liberal" to be 
understood in contemporary political terms. See supra note 11. In addition to citing the 
religious rhetoric of the Civil Rights movement, he also cites with less flourish the support 
of Christian evangelicals forJimmy Carter and the anti-war activities of some clergy during 
the Vietnam War (pp. 48-49, 60, 227-29). 
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and unashamedly religious rhetoric of the nonviolent civil rights move- 
ment of the 1950s and 1960s" (p. 227). Indeed, according to Carter, 
"there is much depressing evidence that the religious voice is required to 
stay out of the public square only when it is pressed in a conservative 
cause" (p. 64). 
Carter says that he seeks to demonstrate how a discussion of contro- 
versial issues might proceed-"without . . . the antireligious fervor that 
often characterizes the liberal case" and "without resort to the sort of 
liberal-bashing that often characterizes the rhetoric of the religious right" 
(p. 15). Thus, he moves from the general topic of God-talk to discussing 
issues such as abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, creationism, 
prayer in public schools, and subsidizing religious education.24 He in- 
forms readers that he is among the long list of scholars criticizing the rule 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,25 in which the Supreme Court determined that, to 
pass Establishment Clause muster, (1) state action must have a secular 
legislative purpose, (2) its principal and primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) the action must not foster 
an excessive entanglement with religion.26 Criticizing the secular pur- 
pose arm of that test, Carter suggests that rather than looking to religious 
motivation, the courts should focus more upon whether the state action 
has the effect of promoting religion (p. 191). 
Culture never completely answers the question of how the "Culture of 
Disbelief" came into being. It traces its beginnings to Roe v. Wade,27 in 
which the United States Supreme Court determined that a woman pos- 
sesses a constitutionally protected right to have an abortion (pp. 
56-58).28 But that explanation must be incomplete, given that Carter 
notes that "l[t] here is little evidence to support the idea that most Ameri- 
cans prefer to think of the religions as remaining outside the public 
square" (pp. 15, 119). In fact, citing surveys, he suggests that the majority 
of Americans are religious (pp. 4, 8, 111, 119, 137, 240).29 Culture makes 
vague references to "opinion leaders," "opinion makers," "well-educated 
professionals," "guardians of the public square," and "the legal culture 
that guards the public square," (pp. 4, 8, 23, 49, 54, 119), implying that 
these groups are responsible.30 Yet, Culture never explains why a religious 
majority would step so robotically to these clearly offbeat drummers. 
24. The merits of these proposals are outside the scope of this Review, except to the 
extent that they relate to the trivialization thesis. 
25. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
26. See id. at 612-13. 
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
28. Carter claims that Roe was like a "cold shower" for conservatives who were forced 
to come out of their "cocoons" of private religion and to take religion to the public square. 
He contends that liberals reacted to this conservative emergence by rejecting openly 
religious discourse (p. 58). 
29. See infra text accompanying note 114. 
30. Michael McConnell has maintained that there exists a "gulf between a largely 
secularized professional and academic elite and most ordinary citizens." McConnell, supra 
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Culture's dominant theme is the way we talk about religion. Carter 
alerts readers that "[t] his book is not about law, but about attitudes-the 
attitudes that we as a political society hold toward religion" (p. 15). He 
stresses that in the cited examples of trivialization, it is the "language cho- 
sen to make the points" that matters (p. 6). He offers that in each exam- 
ple, "one sees a trend in our political and legal cultures toward treating 
religious beliefs as arbitrary and unimportant, a trend supported by a 
rhetoric that implies that there is something wrong with religious devo- 
tion" (p. 6). 
II. CULTURE'S TRIVIALIZATION FLAW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES 
In this section, I examine Culture's evidence that our legal culture 
trivializes religion. Here, I demonstrate that Culture greatly oversimplifies 
the examples it discusses, failing to mention to readers key facts that ar- 
gue against the implications it draws from the case law. Rather than the 
evenhanded treatment of facts that we might expect from Stephen 
Carter, we are provided with selective reporting. 
Carter tells his readers that the courts, and particularly the Supreme 
Court, have allowed the state to "run roughshod" over the religions (p. 
38). But ironically, of the more than seventy cases mentioned in Culture, 
the large majority are offered merely for legal background. Far fewer are 
offered as support for Culture's thesis that the law trivializes religion, and 
the most significant cases Carter draws on involve minority faiths. Sadly, 
in discussing the alleged examples of trivialization in the case law that it 
cites, Culture repeatedly provides misleading glosses. 
The point is illustrated by Culture's references to the United States 
Supreme Court's opinion in Wallace v. Jafftee,31 one of several decisions 
that Culture uses to critique the Lemon test.32 Carter informs readers that 
in Wallace the Court "struck down an Alabama statute allowing schools 
that so desired to set aside one minute for 'meditation or voluntary 
prayer.' " He states that theJustices argued that "the only purpose of the 
note 12, at 126. Carter does not draw the secularization line so clearly in Culture. He 
seems to suggest that religiosity and secularism exist at the same time across the culture. 
For example, he suggests that most members of Congress are religious (pp. 111, 240). 
Carter does not explain whether he would include them among the "opinion makers" or 
"opinion leaders," but it seems logical that he should, not only by virtue of the political 
positions they hold, but also by virtue of the financial resources and educational 
background possessed by most members. Similarly, in his examples of trivialization, he 
sometimes includes challenges to religious leaders. For example, he complains of an 
ordained minister who, being also a therapist, coauthored a book suggesting that one who 
gives up ties with family and material wealth in order to follow a religious community is 
suffering from a "toxic faith." Carter asks how Moses or Mohammed would be judged 
under this definition (p. 81). At another point, he criticizes the National Council of 
Churches for challenging what it considered to be improper invocations of God's name 
during the Republican National Convention (p. 50). 
31. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
32. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
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legislation was a religious one," (i.e., the statute had no secular purpose 
within the meaning of Lemon), and the Justices reasoned that any student 
was free to pray even the absence of a statute (pp. 190-91). Thus, Carter 
tells the public that the Court's reasoning in Wallace "reflects a contempo- 
rary suspicion of [religious] accommodations"33 and asks, " [W] hy should 
it matter that some legislators hope that many students will pray?" (p. 
191). 
The Wallace Court considered the question of whether an Alabama 
statute providing for a moment of silence "for meditation and voluntary 
prayer" in public schools violated the Establishment Clause. At the time 
of that consideration, Alabama also had in force a statute providing for a 
moment of silence for "meditation."34 That statute predated the one 
before the Court. The question before the Court, then, was not, as 
Carter suggests, the choice between a meditation or prayer statute and no 
statute, but rather it was whether the new statute raised Establishment 
Clause problems. Moreover the context of Wallace cannot be ignored in 
interpreting its outcome. State actors took the view that the Constitution 
did not prohibit states from establishing a religion and there was evi- 
dence that some of these actors were doing more than simply affording 
time for voluntary prayer by students.35 
33. The term "accommodations" is used to refer to many different types of state 
action. One can seek accommodation by seeking exemption from generally applicable 
laws when application of those laws would effectively prohibit the exercise of religion. See, 
e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See 
discussion infra text accompanying note 63. At the other end of the spectrum, state 
acknowledgement of religion or use of its symbols (as in the case of state sponsorship of a 
nativity scene in a public square during the Christmas season) has been mentioned in the 
accommodation context. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). Carter says 
that when he uses the term he means those accommodations that are constitutionally 
required (pp. 299-330). However, he notes that others use it to refer to permissible or 
discretionary accommodations as well. 
34. The Court inquired whether this prior statute was still in place at argument. See 
Transcript, December 4, 1984, WaUace, 472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929), reprinted in 
155 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Constitutional Law, 1984 Term Supplement 21 (1986) [hereinafter 155 Landmark Briefs]. 
35. The statute at issue was one of three passed by the state. In 1978, Alabama 
mandated a moment of silence for "meditation" in classrooms, and in 1981, it passed 
another statute permitting a teacher to announce a period of silence, not to exceed one 
minute, " 'for meditation or voluntary prayer.' " Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985). 
Shortly thereafter, teachers in Alabama public schools, where three of Jaffree's young 
children were enrolled, began regularly leading their classes in vocal classroom prayers. 
See id. at 44. The defendants contended that these practices at the time they were 
undertaken were voluntary and not pursuant to any state statute or policy. See Jaffree v. 
Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1983). But see Brief of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, the Alabama Civil Liberties Union, and the National Coalition for Public 
Education and Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, reprinted in 155 Landmark 
Briefs, supra note 34, at 402, 414 (quoting governor's answer as admission that the first and 
second statutes, as well as the "authority of God," authorized the prayer practices). Jaffree 
repeatedly informed school officials that he objected to these practices, but to no avail. 
See Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1106-08 (S.D. Ala. 1983). 
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All of these facts and many others were before the Supreme Court 
and provided the context in which it determined the validity of the 1981 
statute. Culture fails to mention any of them. Nor does it mention that 
among the strongest supporters of Ishmael Jaffree were the members of 
the American Jewish Congress and the National Jewish Community Rela- 
tions Advisory Council.36 
Thereafter, he filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against school 
officials, claiming that the prayer practices violated the Establishment Clause. At that time, 
he did not challenge the statutes themselves. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 42. 
In 1982, after learning ofJaffree's lawsuit, Alabama's Legislature passed a third statute 
permitting a teacher to "lead willing students in a prayer" and also providing the words to a 
specific prayer in which students should be led. In his second amended complaint, Jaffree 
challenged all three statutes and added the governor and other state officials as parties. 
See id. at 43. Subsequently, Jaffree abandoned his challenge to the first statute, see id. at 
40 n.i; see also Brief of Appellees, Ishmael Jaffree, et al. at 2, reprinted in 155 Landmark 
Briefs, supra note 34, at 302, 306, but not before the district court upheld it. SeeJaffree v. 
James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala. 1982). 
Throughout the litigation, defendants argued that contrary to established Supreme 
Court precedent, the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit the establishment of religion by a 
state. See, e.g., Jaffree, 705 F.2d at 1529; Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant George C. 
Wallace at 4, Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (Nos. 83-812 & 83-929), reprinted in 155 Landmark 
Briefs, supra note 34, at 12. The Alabama district court agreed and observed that the 
Supreme Court "has erred in its reading of history." Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 
1128 (ruling prayer practices constitutional). 
The court of appeals reversed the district court, finding that the prayer practices and 
the remaining two statutes were unconstitutional and in so doing, criticized the lower court 
for failing to follow the doctrine of stare decisis. See Jaffree, 705 F.2d at 1529-37. On review, 
the Supreme Court called the district court's observation of its error "remarkable." 
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 48. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the court of appeals' invalidation 
of the prayer practices and the 1982 statute authorizing a specific prayer. The governor 
then argued that the remaining meditation or prayer statute was a permissible 
accommodation of religion. See Brief of Appellant, George C. Wallace, Wallace, 472 U.S. 
38 (Nos. 83-812 & 83-929), reprinted in 155 Landmark Briefs, supra note 34, at 182. 
It is worth noting that Carter himself concedes the Founders' generation probably did 
not intend to prohibit states from establishing a religion (p. 118). Yet, based on modern 
societal considerations, he agrees with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as requiring application of the Establishment Clause to the states, 
see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), although he warns of taking the modern 
requirements analysis too far (pp. 118-20). See also Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution, 100 Yale LJ. 1131, 1157-60 (1991) (questioning Cantwell analysis). 
36. See Brief of the American Jewish Congress on Behalf of Itself and the National 
Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, 
Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929), reprinted in 155 Landmark Briefs, supra note 
34, at 471. These amici claimed to represent "all majorJewish communities in the United 
States." Id. at viii. More than 500 intervenors supported defendants' position. See Brief of 
Appellants Douglas T. Smith et al. at 3-4, Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929), 
reprinted in 155 Landmark Briefs, supra note 34, at 237. Several religious organizations 
composed predominantly of mainstream adherents also supported the governor. See, e.g., 
Brief of Moral Majority, Inc. as Amicus and Brief of Christian Legal Society and National 
Association of Evangelicals as Amici Curiae, Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929), 
both available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File. The United States filed an amicus 
brief urging the constitutionality of the statute. See Brief of the United States as Amicus 
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Carter states that he generally agrees with the outcomes in the cases 
on prayer in public schools, including Wallace.37 Thus, his complaint 
seems based upon meaning that he reads into a questionable gloss of the 
Court's reasoning. But the facts he does not mention demonstrate that 
what was at issue in Wallace was considerably more than contemporary 
suspicion of religious accommodations or concern over the mere hopes 
of legislators.38 
Even construing Carter's complaint as an attack on the Lemon test in 
general does not save it. Elsewhere, Carter admits that the courts tend to 
ignore the requirements of Lemon when applying the test stringently 
would prove too disruptive to mainstream religious interests (p. 113).39 
At least where mainstream faiths are concerned, this abandonment of the 
Lemon factors argues against the pattern of legal disrespect that Carter 
discerns.40 
Curiae, Wallace, 472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929) reprinted in 155 Landmark Briefs, 
supra note 34, at 366. According to one court, Jaffree considered himself "an agnostic" 
and believed that exposure to religion in school would prevent his children from having an 
open mind and freely making a choice to accept or reject religion in the future. Jaffree v. 
James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 729 (S.D. Ala. 1982). 
37. In addition to Wallace, see Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); School Dist. of 
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
38. Surely, with respect to the first meditation statute, some of the legislators who 
voted for it hoped that students would pray. 
39. Indeed, one commentator has opined, "To the extent that there remains a secular 
purpose standard, it is no longer meaningful." Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as 
Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 747, 769 (1993). Another has observed 
that it is not at all clear that Lemon does not permit a post hoc secular rationale in order to 
justify state action that was originally religiously motivated. See Sullivan, supra note 12. 
40. In these discussions, Carter flips Lemon, suggesting that it invalidates state action 
any time there is a religious purpose, regardless of whether or not a secular purpose is also 
present. He notes that courts have "confus[ed] the political purpose for which the statute 
was enacted with the religious sensibilities of legislators or their constituents" and that 
Lemon would be workable if the courts accepted any legitimate political purpose (pp. 
111-12). 
In fact, the Court has at least given lip service to the claim that state action that is 
religiously motivated can pass Establishment Clause muster if it also has a secular purpose 
and the religious purpose is not preeminent. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (statute that is 
motivated in part by a religious purpose may still satisfy secular purpose test, but "must be 
invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion"). The problem is 
that examples of such cases involving state action on behalf of mainstream faiths are 
somewhat rare. Carter dismisses both Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding 
town sponsorship of nativity scene) and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1963) 
(upholding prayers at the opening of legislative sessions) as isolated examples and yet 
inconsistencies that clearly demonstrate why Lemon is an unworkable test (pp. 113-14). 
But in some cases, the Court has also noted no Establishment Clause bar to the state's 
providing the same access to its largess as afforded secular groups, so long as there was no 
risk of excessive entanglement with religious interests. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Bowen, 487 
U.S. 589 (1988) (approving inclusion of religious organizations in grants for sex and 
pregnancy education programs and noting that such inclusion was necessary for success of 
the program); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971) (plurality opinion) 
(upholding inclusion of religiously sponsored colleges among institutions receiving federal 
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Carter's references to the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Roberts v. 
Madigan4l offer a different variation on the same theme. Of Roberts, Cul- 
ture states: 
When citizens do act in their public selves as though their faith 
matters, they risk not only ridicule, but actual punishment. In 
Colorado, a public school teacher was ordered by his superiors, 
on pain of disciplinary action, to remove his personal Bible from 
his desk where students might see it. He was forbidden to read 
it silently when his students were involved in other activities. He 
was also told to take away books on Christianity he had added to 
the classroom library, although books on Native American reli- 
gious traditions, as well as on the occult, were allowed to remain. 
A federal appeals court upheld the instruction, explaining that 
grants for building academic facilities and noting facilities would be used solely for secular 
purposes and there was a low risk of entanglement); Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 
(1970) (churches may be included among wide array of nonprofit groups doing work for 
public good and entitled to tax exemption); see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (decided after Culture and granting religious 
groups the same access to public school premises as afforded secular groups does not 
violate the Establishment Clause). These cases indicate that it is too simplistic to suggest 
that the mere presence of a religious benefit constitutes an Establishment Clause violation 
under Lemon. 
Carter's attempt to demonstrate his point by using Edwards v. Aguillard is similarly 
hyperbolic. In Edwards, he claims the Court invalidated a law requiring schools to teach 
scientific creationism in public schools "because most of its supporters were religiously 
motivated . . . ." (p. 111). Carter contrasts his own view, saying that he agrees with the 
outcome because creationism is "bad science," not because religion was an issue (pp. 
161-62) and analogizes that the logic of Edwards would necessarily invalidate the teaching 
of evolution or a nuclear arms freeze if either were religiously motivated (p. 111). 
Carter does not mention that in Edwards the state claimed that the avowed secular 
purpose of teaching creationism was to protect academic freedom and that the Court 
rejected this claim as a sham for a preeminent religious purpose. See id. at 94. Nor does 
Carter himself attempt to argue that the academic freedom position was not a sham, and 
indeed, he defends the result of Edwards, if not the alleged logic. Moreover, Carter fails to 
acknowledge that the teaching of evolution or of a nuclear arms freeze is not inherently 
religious. These subjects remain quite distinguishable from creationism and the logic 
supporting the exclusion of one, whether appropriate or not, does not necessarily compel 
the exclusion of the other. 
It is worth noting that because mainstream religionists control both the state and 
private sector institutions, and thus can both satisfy their secular needs and have a 
reasonable chance at creating a religiously favorable climate for themselves through the 
exercise of that control, they face more difficulty than minority faiths and cultures in 
arguing that express recognition of religious activity serves some "secular" purpose. I 
would argue that the "motivation" behind the school prayer legislation in Wallace or the 
scientific creationism law in Edwards should be, for Establishment Clause purposes, 
distinguishable from the "motivation" behind legislation the majority passes to preserve 
minority religious or cultural rights. It is noteworthy that the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act Amendments specifically state that "the lack of adequate and clear legal 
protection for the religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and 
marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase the risk that they will be exposed to 
discriminatory treatment." See American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344 (Oct. 6, 1994) [hereinafter AIRFA Amendments]. 
41. 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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the teacher could not be allowed to create a religious atmos- 
phere in the classroom; which, it seems, might happen if the 
students knew he was a Christian. (Pp. 11-12.) 
At another point he says the Tenth Circuit: 
held, . . . that a school district violated no religious freedom 
rights when it forbade a teacher to display his personal Bible 
where the students could see it, or to read it silently when his 
students were involved in work that did not require his direct 
supervision .... Indeed, the judges suggested, even had the 
district not implemented the ban, the Establishment Clause 
would probably have provided a basis for a court order includ- 
ing the same prohibition. (P. 189.)42 
In Roberts, a fifth grade public school teacher had set aside daily si- 
lent reading time, permitting students to bring their own books or select 
from a large classroom library comprised of books from the teacher's per- 
sonal collection. Two of those books were The Bible in Pictures and The 
Stories ofJesus. During this period, the teacher would often silently read 
the Bible. The teacher had also put up a poster in the classroom that 
featured an outdoor scene and read, "You have only to open your eyes to 
see the hand of God." After a visiting parent complained, the school dis- 
trict required removal of the books and the poster and ordered Roberts 
to cease reading his Bible and keeping it on his desk during classroom 
hours. Roberts sued. 
In that lawsuit, Roberts did not assert a free exercise claim. He 
claimed instead that the school district had violated his rights to free ex- 
pression and academic freedom under the First Amendment. He also 
claimed that, in removing only the Christian books, the school district 
disfavored Christianity among the religions in violation of the Establish- 
ment Clause.43 
42. Although Roberts is only a Tenth Circuit case, it is one of the more frequently 
mentioned cases in Culture (pp. 12, 57, 108, 172, 189). 
43. Roberts argued that his purpose in reading the Bible was to set an example of an 
adult reading for his students. According to the district court, he compared his use of the 
Bible and religious material in class to the term "one nation under God" in the pledge of 
allegiance. See Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1509 (D. Colo. 1989), aff'd, 921 
F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990). The majority addressed the complaint as Roberts 
characterized it. The dissent, while expressly noting that Roberts was not relying upon the 
Free Exercise Clause, nevertheless argued that the court should have treated Roberts's 
claim as if it were a free exercise claim, and thus required the state to show a "compelling 
interest" that required the burdening of Roberts's right to the assumed free exercise of his 
religion. See Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1060. The dissent did not explain why Roberts should not 
be held to his pleadings like any other plaintiff. See id. at 1059-64; see also discussion of 
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) infra note 46. 
The district court, while noting that Roberts did not raise a free exercise claim, stated, 
without the benefit of briefing or argument, that such a claim would not have altered its 
analysis. See Roberts, 702 F. Supp. at 1512. 
Thus, ironically, Roberts's choice to couch his argument in secular terms allowed 
defendants to use religion offensively, i.e., as the reason why the Establishment Clause 
might be violated, and also permitted the court to consider his actions collectively (rather 
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The Tenth Circuit sustained the school district's actions. In so do- 
ing, the majority concluded that the two Christian books in question were 
written primarily for the purpose of encouraging the acceptance of a par- 
ticular faith and that, by contrast, the others were "about" religion.44 
These facts are absent from Carter's description. Had they been 
given their due, some readers might have concluded that the court was 
concerned about more than just what would happen if the students knew 
that Roberts was a Christian.45 
Culture's discussion of the Wallace and Roberts cases are not isolated 
examples of omissions. With troubling frequency, Culture glosses over 
key facts that if present, would weaken the positions it espouses.46 More- 
than, for example, simply the Bible reading itself). Moreover, it also freed the court from 
considering the free exercise implications of his behavior. With respect to such litigation 
choices, should plaintiffs be heard to complain, "the culture made me do it"? 
44. Reviewing their contents, the court distinguished these from the books on Native 
American religions and on the occult, as well as from the Bible itself, arguing that the latter 
books were about religion, while the former encouraged acceptance of a particular faith. 
The Tenth Circuit took pains to state, and Carter acknowledges (p. 207), that there is no 
ban against teaching about Christianity or about any other religion in the classroom. The 
court also expressly recognized that the Bible is both a religious text and otherwise a great 
work of literature. See Roberts, 702 F. Supp. at 1513. In fact, at Roberts' request, the court 
ordered the school district to replace the Bible in the school's central library after 
someone had removed it from the shelves. 
It is worth noting that Roberts did not challenge the order to take down the poster. 
See Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1059. For this reason, the dissent complained that court should not 
have considered the poster in its analysis. See id. at 1059 n.1 (Barret, CJ., dissenting). 
45. Building on this problematic interpretation of Roberts, Carter also offers other 
problematic hypotheticals. He asks, in effect, "what next?" 
One wonders what the school, and the courts, might do if, as many Christians do, 
the teacher came to school on Ash Wednesday with ashes in the shape of a cross 
imposed on his forehead-would he be required to wash them off? He just 
might. Early in 1993, a judge required a prosecutor arguing a case on Ash 
Wednesday to clean the ashes from his forehead, lest the jury might be 
influenced by its knowledge of the prosecutor's religiosity. (P. 12.) 
Carter offers no support for his suggestion that the prosecutor's personal religious 
convictions should automatically trump the constitutional right of a person accused of a 
criminal act to be tried before an impartialjury. He fails to explain why one should ignore 
Roberts's decision to characterize his claim as a free expression case is not important nor 
does he tell us why the cumulative effect of Roberts's actions should be ignored. 
46. Consider the references to Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 
112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). Carter tells readers that the Supreme Court was "happy" to back 
airports that wanted to restrict solicitation by devotees of Krishna Consciousness merely 
because travelers found them irritating. The plaintiff society was composed of followers of 
Krishna Consciousness, a religion whose teaching required its adherents to venture into 
public places in order to proselytize, to distribute religious literature, to seek monetary and 
other support, and to provide information about their religion. The restrictions in 
question prohibited solicitation and distribution inside New York City airports (but not on 
sidewalks outside) and applied to all types of groups, religious and otherwise. Plaintiffs did 
not challenge the regulations as a violation of their free exercise rights, but rather claimed 
that the regulations violated civil rights laws and the right to free expression under the 
First Amendment. The Supreme Court settled the solicitation question by determining 
that the airports were not a public forum. However, in a companion opinion, the Court 
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over, with respect to the Supreme Court, Culture is quick to point out 
when the Court acts contrary to religion, but far less eager to inform its 
readers of favorable treatments It is silent on the pattern of sharp disa- 
struck down the ban on distributing literature. See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992). 
Building on this interpretation, Carter invites readers to "picture the response should 
the airports try to regulate the wearing of crucifixes or yarmulkes on similar grounds of 
irritation" (p. 9). But Catholics andJews were covered by the statute and although Krishna 
Consciousness followers have a unique dress, religious dress restrictions were not at issue. 
According to Carter, in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), the Supreme 
Court "shrugged" when ajewish military officer challenged disciplinary action against him 
for wearing a yarmulke in violation of military regulations (p. 12). In fact, Goldman 
generated five separate opinions, and four justices dissented. Carter devotes no attention 
to the unique nature of the military environment and, in the end, concedes, as he must, 
that Goldman has been counteracted by legislation, at least insofar as it might affect the 
practices of mainstream adherents and religious Jews (p. 12). 
He also tells readers that in Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 
(1989), the Supreme Court "warned ... that the protection of religiously based refusals to 
work (at least on Sunday) might vanish if 'Sunday shopping, or Sunday sporting, for that 
matter, [would] grind to a halt" (p. 131) (quoting Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835). In fact, Frazee 
upheld a plaintiff's right to unemployment benefits even though he turned down a job 
offer because it required him to work on his Sabbath. In so holding, the Court quoted a 
passage from the opinion of the highest state court to reach the merits (which focused 
upon America's weekend way of life and suggested that massive movement away from 
Sunday employment would result if Frazee succeeded on his claim). The Court 
commented that there was no evidence in the record to support such arguments, and that 
while compelling state interests could override a legitimate free exercise claim, "[n]o such 
interest has been presented here." Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835. Still, Carter confidently tells 
readers that the Court issued a warning that shopping and sporting might take precedence 
over religion. 
Witness too, Carter's complaint that the courts will sometimes order blood 
transfusions for children of Jehovah's Witnesses over their parents' religious objections 
(pp. 219-20) and his attacks on Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (otherwise called "a rather spectacular victory" for religion (p. 130)). 
Douglas argued that the views of the children should be solicited in deciding whether 
Amish parents have the right to take their children out of public school after completion 
of the eighth grade. 
Carter claims that the problem in these cases is anti-religious animus. He ignores his 
earlier observation that were the practices noted above followed by mainstream adherents 
there would be little controversy (p. 128). He also ignores the question of the child's 
competing right, a question raised by a recent case in which a 15-year-old adherent to 
orthodoxJudaism challenged his parents' custodial rights on the ground that they did not 
permit him to be as strictly observant of his faith as he would like. See Robert Hanley, 
Jewish Teen-Ager Fights Return To His Parents, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1994, at B5. In fact, 
one could even argue that Douglas's approach in Yoder places a higher value on religious 
choices than does Carter's, because it suggests that even children have the right to make 
them. 
47. For example, in telling readers that the Court banned solicitation of money by the 
adherents in Krishna Consciousness, Carter does not mention that, in a companion case, the 
Court sustained plaintiffs' challenge to a related ban on distributing literature (as opposed 
to soliciting money) inside the same airport. Whether or not the linedrawing makes sense, 
the fact is that the Court sided with religious plaintiffs. 
Interestingly enough, when Carter references the actions ofJudge Brevard Hand, who 
ordered the removal from classrooms of forty-four books that he concluded promoted the 
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greement among Justices which typifies decisions that reject religious 
rights claims.48 Even when majority opinions are favorable to religious 
litigants, Culture discusses concurring or dissenting opinions as support 
for the bias claim, although they are poor indicators of the Court's overall 
approach.49 Culture attacks the Court's own line drawing yet reveals no 
discernable bright line when it attempts the same.50 
Sometimes, Culture's eagerness to read meaning into language back- 
fires, as Carter's own choice of words opens him up to the same criticisms 
he aims at others.5' And surprisingly often, Carter finds himself agreeing 
religion of secular humanism, Carter does not point out that the case was actually a 
continuation of the Wallace saga (p. 171). See Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. 
Supp. 939, 942-44 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684, 686-88 (11th Cir. 1987). After the 
Supreme Court's decision, intervenors in Wallace renewed an earlier motion before the 
district court for "alternate relief," seeking an order prohibiting the state school system 
from promoting "'the religions of secularism, humanism, evolution, materialism, 
agnosticism, atheism and others'." Smith, 827 F.2d at 686. While noting that Hand was 
"quickly slapped down" by the court of appeals, Carter observes that Hand may have been 
on to something. Even if secular humanism is not a religion, he contends, it "might 
properly be labeled an ideology" (p. 171). This ideology, he asserts, is deeply alienating to 
some sincerely religious persons (p. 172). That one side is offended by another's 
expressions does not, ultimately, of course, control Establishment Clause or Free Exercise 
Clause question. Moreover, this subsequent history of Wallace further supports the notion 
that the Supreme Court's concern went beyond mere suspicion of motivations. 
48. Cases concerning religious rights have a history of fracturing the Court. See, e.g., 
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (successful Establishment Clause challenge to 
invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies at public schools; four separate 
opinions, four dissenting Justices); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) Jewish 
military officer prohibited from wearing yarmulke in violation of military regulations; five 
separate opinions, four dissentingJustices); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (approving of denial of employment benefits to Native 
American churchmembers fired after drug tests revealed they used peyote, even though 
they consumed it in a bona fide religious ceremony; three separate opinions, four 
dissenting justices); see also discussion of Smith infra note 63. 
49. For example, Carter highlights the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor in 
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (p. 5) and the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Douglas in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (p. 130). 
50. Carter sanctions the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) for its 
"ridiculous hemming and hawing" over whether a creche in a public holiday display has 
religious significance (saying that it clearly does and that the decision to permit the 
government-sponsored creche was wrong (p. 94)). At the same time he complains about a 
federal appellate court that banned what was, in Carter's view, a "rather bland 'Motorist's 
Prayer' to God that appeared on official state maps" (pp. 110-11, 123). See Hall v. 
Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). 
51. In discussing Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 711, Carter inadvertently demonstrates 
the difficulties of drawing nefarious meaning from language (p. 6). In that case the Court 
rejected under the Establishment Clause a Connecticut statute that gave an absolute right 
to sabbath observers not to work on their sabbath. Without challenging the outcome, 
Carter focuses on a phrase from the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor in which she 
observes, "All employees, regardless of their religious orientation, would value the benefit 
which the statute bestows on Sabbath observers-the right to select the day of the week in 
which to refrain from labor." Id. at 711. Thus, Carter notes Michael McConnell's 
observation that religious Jews would be surprised to hear that they "select" their sabbath 
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with the various courts' outcomes, thus raising the question of whether 
the legal and practical significance of his complaint is merely that Carter 
would prefer that the Court use different words.52 
Three facts render Culture's tendencies toward excess a particular 
point of concern. First, Culture purports to offer an objective view of the 
legal and political landscape (i.e., promising a more mature discussion 
about religion than that usually heard from liberals and conservatives) .53 
But Culture fails to deliver. Second, because Culture is a book directed to 
the general public, many in Culture's audience are unfamiliar with legal 
analysis and the cases discussed. They are, thus, largely reliant upon the 
author for information about the courts' approaches. Knowing more, 
some might feel that Culture betrays that trust.54 Third, Carter must ad- 
since they have been under the impression for thousands of years that it was ordained by 
God (pp. 6-7) (citing McConnell, supra note 12, at 115)). But only pages later, discussing 
those Christians who believe in the exclusivity of Jesus Christ, Carter himself says that he 
believes that this approach betrays a lack of faith in God's charity, "but everyone is entitled 
to choose a religious belief" (p. 90) (emphasis added). Could not one intent on finding ill 
will in Carter's words charge him with religious disrespect by claiming that Christ's 
exclusivity is ordained, and not the result of a choice? 
52. As noted, Carter agrees with the Court's outcome in the School Prayer Cases, see 
supra text accompanying note 38, and with the outcome in Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (Amish 
parents have right to take children out of school after eighth grade) (p. 130). He also 
agrees with a New York district court's decision that a Catholic group sponsoring the St. 
Patrick's day parade had a First Amendment right to preclude gays from marching under a 
banner indicating that they are gay (pp. 33-34). See New York County Bd. of Ancient 
Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
53. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
54. Unfortunately, the interpretive attitude described here is not limited to Culture's 
discussion of case law. The very first reference in Culture takes the clear language of a 
letter-to-the-editor of Newsweek, and substitutes a new interpretation of the letter. The 
writer wrote to comment upon a cover story on prayer entitled "Talking to God." Carter 
tells his readers that the "disgruntled reader ... want[ed] to know why so much space had 
been dedicated to such nonsense" (p. 4). The letter stated the following: 
"Talking to God" is a theocratic tract masquerading as a news article, a religious 
sermon touting prayer as a nostrum for all ailments. As in all such treatises, 
strange and marvelous happenings are attributed to supernatural causes without 
reference to alternate explanations. Surely there are scientists galore who will 
vigorously dispute the allegation that heart patients in a San Francisco hospital 
were magically healed by the prayers of strangers. And there must be sociologists 
eager to challenge Father Andrew M. Greeley's more peculiar findings, such as 
his assertion that 20 percent of atheists and agnostics pray-presumably to a deity 
whose existence they deny. Your reporters unaccountably failed to solicit their 
views. The Newsweek I am familiar with publishes all sides of controversial issues 
and lets readers make up their own minds. What happened here? 
Letter to the Editor, Newsweek,Jan. 27, 1992, at 10. While the letter writer clearly did not 
himself believe in prayer (which is, after all, his right), the letter objected to the form of 
the discourse, not to the discourse itself. Carter's gloss only makes sense if one concludes 
that the letter writer said one thing, but really meant another. 
Moreover, not all the printed letters were negative. Indeed, in an editors' note, 
Newsweek commented that responses to the article "were as heartfelt as they were 
polarized" and that "[m]any praised our report for discussing the nonsecular." But the 
note also stated that "many atheists and agnostics-who felt underrepresented in our 
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mit that at the heart of some resistance to religious speech is a fear that 
the devoutly religious will see the ends as justifying the means. Culture's 
approach does not assuage that fear. 
I believe that Stephen Carter is right to challenge those who think 
that God-talk has absolutely no place in the public square, although, as I 
will discuss later, I quarrel with his characterization of the problem. I also 
agree that religion is uniquely important speech to the speakers, 
although that does not necessarily render it reasonable to expect hearers 
to view it the same way. But despite these points of agreement, I cannot 
agree that the case law supports the broad generalizations that Carter 
makes, certainly not insofar as mainstream faiths are concerned. In the 
end, while complaining that the law trivializes religion, Culture itself trivi- 
alizes the law,55 lulling its readers into a false sense that religious freedom 
claims are really quite simple; that the battle is between the religious on 
the one hand and the secular on the other. But anyone seriously con- 
cerned about these issues should be troubled by this model. In focusing 
on mainstream interests while purporting to offer universal observations, 
Culture glosses over serious differences in perspective between minority 
piece-wrote to express skepticism about the power of prayer." And should we not, as 
Michael Kinsley has already noted, attach some significance to the fact that Newsweek did a 
cover story on prayer? See Kinsley, supra note 7, at 4. Surely that newsmagazine suffers no 
shortage of liberals or elitists among its writers and editors. Other references in Culture 
that present similar problems. 
55. The difficulties of discerning a pattern of antireligious animus in the law is 
demonstrated by four recently decided cases which directly impact upon Carter's thesis. In 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), the Court 
held that a school district violated the free speech rights of a church when it refused to 
grant the church the same access to school premises as afforded other groups. The Court 
determined that the Establishment Clause would not be offended by the granting of such 
access. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), 
the Court struck down a city ordinance banning animal sacrifice on the ground that the 
ordinance was specifically aimed at adherents to the religion of Santeria which employed 
animal sacrifice as one of its rituals in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. In Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), the Court found that state provision of 
a sign interpreter to interpret in a mainstream parochial school in the same way that such 
interpreters are provided for children in public schools did not violate the Establishment 
Clause. On the other hand, in Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994), the Court held that the state of New York violated the 
Establishment Clause when it set up a separate school district for practitioners of a strict 
form of Judaism, even though the instruction in the district was entirely secular. 
Culture includes a brief footnote about Lukumi Babalu, which was apparently decided 
at its press time, saying "Sometimes, of course, uncommon things happen" (p. 124 n.*). 
Carter addresses both Lamb's Chapel and Lukumi Babalu more fully in Stephen L. Carter, 
The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 118 (1993). He notes therein 
that these cases "suggest that the Justices may yet decide to rescue religious freedom." Id. 
at 119. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in KiryasJoel, Carter reportedly stated that 
that case was a good example of how the state can provide aid to private school students 
without violating the separation between church and state and that it offered the Supreme 
Court the opportunity to reverse decisions prohibiting governmental provision of remedial 
education on parochial school premises. See William H. Freivogel, Supreme Court Case 
May Punch Hole in Church-State Wall, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Mar. 28, 1994, at 4A. 
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and majority religious and cultural groups on the question of religious 
freedom. In the end, as I contend below, minority group perspectives are 
dangerously shortchanged. 
III. Culture's Trivialization of the Concerns of Minority Faiths 
and Cultures 
In this section, I contend that the most solid evidence Culture offers 
that religion does not receive its due is that involving minority faiths and 
cultures. But while Carter seems to express genuine concern for the pro- 
tection of these groups, in focusing on mainstream perspectives, he fails 
to adequately describe minority group concerns or to offer a workable 
model for religious respect that protects their interests. 
I also provide a specific example of how Carter's mainstream focus 
leads him to trivialize the concerns of nonmainstream groups when I con- 
sider his comments in a chapter called "Political Preaching." There, too, 
I show that his conclusions emerge out of his own theological and polit- 
ical assumptions, assumptions that are not universal. Carter ends up 
committing the very crime he condemns. 
A. Which Culture? 
Culture expressly recognizes that nonmainstream religions are most 
in need of accommodations (pp. 125-35). Unfortunately, Culture never 
attempts an analysis of the concerns of these groups that is distinct from 
that which it has done for mainstream faiths and peoples. By characteriz- 
ing the problem as "religion," Culture offers a "one-size-fits-all" analysis 
that is ill-suited for many minority faiths and minority cultures. 
Culture's discussions of Employment Division, Department of Human Re- 
sources of Oregon v. Smith56 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Assoc.57 illustrate my point. In Smith, the Supreme Court permitted a 
state to deny unemployment compensation to two members of the Native 
American church58 who had been fired from a drug rehabilitation center 
after they had tested positive for peyote, a hallucinogen the use of which 
was prohibited by state law. The members claimed that they had used 
peyote as part of a bona fide religious service.59 The Smith majority held 
that because the law prohibiting the use of peyote was a generally applica- 
ble one, the state need not meet the "compelling interest" test, that is, it 
56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
57. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
58. With respect to the terms "Native American" and "Indian," I use whichever term 
the source discussed employs. Otherwise, I use them interchangeably. Only one of the 
defendants in Smith was Native American. See Transcript, November 6, 1989, at 4, Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (no. 88-1213), reprinted in 196 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law: 1989 Term Supplement 806 
(1991) [hereinafter 196 Landmark Briefs]. 
59. Under Oregon law, violation of the state's drug laws constituted work-related 
misconduct that barred an award of unemployment benefits. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
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need not show some compelling interest that justifies the burdening of 
the religious practitioners' free exercise right. Many believe that in so 
holding, the Court failed to distinguish this case from prior cases in 
which it had applied the compelling interest test to state burdens on reli- 
gious exercises.60 
In Lyng, the Court permitted the government to build a road 
through federal lands even though all sides agreed that these operations 
would render impossible the performance of certain necessary religious 
practices and rituals by Native Americans living in the vicinity of the land 
(who had, of course, inhabited the land long before the federal govern- 
ment came). 
Culture dutifully describes Smith and Lyng as cases involving religious 
traditions outside the mainstream (p. 126). Thus, Carter tells his readers 
that such religions as these are most in need of "accommodations"-in 
this case, exemptions from generally applicable laws to enable the free 
exercise of religious rights (p. 128). Referencing Lyng, he invites the 
readers to consider the uproar if New York City tried to take St. Patrick's 
Cathedral by eminent domain or, considering Smith, if a state were to 
outlaw the religious use of wine instead of peyote (p. 9). But after spin- 
ning out such hypotheticals, he correctly observes that they are just that: 
hypothetical cases (pp. 9, 128). Indeed, as Culture notes, such actions 
would not likely occur because they affect the interests of the mainstream 
and that the mainstream "will not countenance a state effort to shut down 
their religious observances; indeed, the state would never try" (p. 128). 
Thus, Culture argues that accommodations are needed for minority reli- 
gious groups because, citing Frederick Mark Gedicks, "'Without exemp- 
tions, some religious groups will likely be crushed by the weight of 
majoritarian law and culture'" (p. 129).61 
One can appreciate Culture's attempt at including minority faiths in 
its efforts to vindicate religious rights. But Culture's description of these 
cases simply in terms of "religion" is misleading. Smith and Lyng involved 
not just religions outside of the mainstream, but Native American reli- 
gions. By presenting these cases to readers in terms of a degree of religious 
bias, Culture translates them into "majority speak" and, at the same time, 
strips them of their racial and cultural context, a context that is essential 
to a full appreciation of both the deprivation of the right and to prescrib- 
ing the necessary remedy. In dealing with both mainstream and minority 
faiths, Culture separates the inseparable-race, culture and religion. It 
thus moves racial and cultural oppression to the periphery ("majority 
speak") as if what defines the religious experience of Native Americans- 
60. See infra note 63. 
61. Carter is quoting Gedicks, supra note 12, at 690. 
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or other groups that have suffered historically from racial or cultural op- 
pression-is plain vanilla religious disrespect.62 
The danger in an approach that ignores how issues of race and cul- 
ture affect religious freedom debates is revealed in Justice Scalia's now 
famous lines of Smith in which he tells members of the Native American 
Church, and others like them, that they have to rely upon the political 
process to protect their rights to practice their religion.63 While Carter 
disagrees with both the logic and outcome of Smith, Culture's approach 
62. Such an approach cannot be justified by the reply that we should highlight our 
similarities rather than our differences. Where ignoring differences merely serves to 
advance the interest of the dominant group, the approach must be rejected. 
63. Declining to apply the compelling interest test, Justice Scalia viewed the issue as 
follows: 
If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied 
across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded.... [Miany 
laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting 
anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious 
beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. 
* * * 
Values that are protected against government interference through 
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political 
process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the 
press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the 
dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative 
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its 
legislation as well. . . . [citations omitted] [T]o say that a nondiscriminatory 
religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say 
that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its 
creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving 
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious 
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in 
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious 
beliefs. 
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888, 890 
(1990) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia's express tying of the danger of anarchy to 
society's toleration of diversity of religious beliefs should lead one to wonder what other 
types of toleration of diverse expression or diversity in general would be viewed as courting 
anarchy. 
Smith generated three separate opinions. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall dissented, accusing the majority of "mischaracterizing this Court's 
precedents." Id. at 908. Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the outcome, called the 
majority's logic a dramatic departure from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence 
and "incompatible with our Nation's fundamental commitment to religious liberty." Id. at 
891. All four of these justices would have applied a compelling interest test; however, in so 
doing, O'Connor would have reached the same outcome as the majority, viewing the 
state's war against drugs as a compelling interest despite the fact that many states had 
exempted religious use of peyote from drug laws. See id. at 904-05. More recently, in 
Lukumi Babalu, Justice Souter spent most of his extensive concurring opinion pleading 
with the Court to reverse Smith and explaining why that could be done consistent with the 
doctrine of stare decisis. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. 
Ct. 2217, 2240-49 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring). 
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does not provide much more assurance. Carter observes that "the polit- 
ical process will protect only the mainstream religions, not the many 
smaller groups that exist at the margins" (p. 28), but he fails to acknowl- 
edge that where the religions are concerned, size does not define polit- 
ical power. With respect to the economic resources of the members of a 
given religion and thus the religion's political power, the correlation be- 
tween religion and the race of the members of the religion is quite signifi- 
cant (p. 128).64 
Having defined the issues presented in Smith and Lyng solely in 
terms of religion, Culture then uses Smith and Lyng to prop up the main- 
stream claim of religious disrespect, which absent cases such as these, 
would be leaning at a very precarious angle. And so, Culture explains: 
Smith shows clearly just where the current Court's Free Exercise 
jurisprudence is heading: toward a clear separation of church 
and self, a world in which citizens who adopt religious practices 
at variance with official state policy are properly made subject to 
coercive authority of the state, which can, without fear of judi- 
cial intervention, pressure them to change those practices. (P. 
127.)65 
I would venture a guess that from the perspective of most Native Ameri- 
cans concerned about Smith, the case did not show where Free Exercise 
jurisprudence is heading; rather, it confirmed where Free Exercise juris- 
prudence has always been.66 
In fact, while Culture relies heavily upon Smith and Lyng to support its 
thesis that American culture is suspicious of religion, these cases tend to 
challenge rather than support the mainstream's case of religious trivial- 
64. The point is recognized in Barry A. Kosmin & Seymour P. Lachman, One Nation 
Under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society (1993), which reports polling 
information from over 113,000 Americans, purportedly the largest and most 
comprehensive study ever done on religious loyalties in America. The authors point out 
that the religions are social and cultural groups as well as religious groups. See id. at 264. 
They also noted that, among Protestants and Catholics, an important factor in determining 
the "social status" of a given religious group as a whole was the presence of African 
Americans, Latinos, and Asians within the group, since race affects the members' 
education and economic opportunities. See id. at 264-69. In the case of the Native 
Americans, their ability to call upon political power is further complicated by the political 
relationship between the Indian nations and the federal and state governments. 
65. When the religious are required to abandon religion in the public square, Carter 
says that a separation of religion from "self" occurs (p. 127). 
66. Justice Blackmun compared the sacramental use of peyote by the Native 
Americans to the use of wine in a Catholic communion. He noted that during Prohibition 
the federal government exempted the use of wine for sacramental purposes from its ban 
on alcohol possession and use. "However compelling the Government's then general 
interest in prohibiting the use of alcohol may have been, it could not plausibly have 
asserted an interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh Catholics' right to take 
communion." Smith, 494 U.S. at 913 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). It is also worth noting that 
at the time that the AIFRA was passed, the sacramental use of peyote was a crime in 22 
states. See AIRFA Amendments of 1994, supra note 40. The sacramental use of wine was a 
crime in none. 
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ization. As Culture concedes, before the ink on the Smith opinion had 
dried, many in mainstream America railed against its logic (pp. 127, 
130).67 In fact, as Carter also acknowledges, the uproar against the rea- 
soning of Smith (if not the outcome) was so significant that Congress 
passed and the President signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
("RFRA") which, by its terms, restored the compelling interest standard 
rejected in Smith (p. 269).68 
Ironically, while the triumph of the RFRA may have resolved the un- 
certainty that Smith created for mainstream Christians andJews, it did not 
provide adequate assurances needed by adherents to Native American re- 
ligions who were, after all, at the center of the Smith case. In fact, Justice 
O'Connor had hinted in Smith that even under a compelling interest test, 
Native Americans who used peyote in religious ceremonies would lose.69 
But contrary to the suggestion in Culture's analysis, they would lose not 
because their claims were religious in nature. These adherents would lose 
because they are not in the majority culture and consequently they do not 
have the political and economic resources to incorporate their cultural or 
religious ideals into the relevant law. Furthermore, they would lose be- 
cause the majority culture has yet to place the same value upon those 
adherents' right to religious freedom as they place on their own. 
Relief for some Native American religionists came in the fall of 1994, 
when Congress passed and the President signed the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act of 1994 ("AIRFA").70 However, that Act was lim- 
ited to preserving the right to the sacramental use of peyote. At the time 
this Review went to press, efforts to seek broader legal protections for 
Native American religious activities, such as the protection of sacred sites 
sought in Lyng, had been unsuccessful.7' The difference in the public 
67. A large number of scholars criticized Smith. See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Free 
Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 91, 91-102 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The 
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 54-68; Michael W. McConnell, Free 
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1114-28 (1990); 
Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 Am. 
Indian L. Rev. 1, 11-26 (1991). 
68. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. ? 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter RFRA]. The RFRA's impact remains to 
be seen. See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
230, 273-76 (1994) (questioning whether Congress can constitutionally require the states 
to apply a compelling interest test in light of the Smith opinion). See also Swanner v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994) (over Justice Thomas's dissent, 
denying certiorari in case in which state court held state antidiscrimination statutes 
provided sufficiently compelling interest to override landlord's refusal to rent to 
unmarried couples on religious grounds). 
69. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 904-06 (1990) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (arguing that state has compelling interest 
in prohibiting the possession of peyote by its citizens and finding that exempting religious 
peyote use would interfere with that interest). 
70. Pub. L. No. 103-344. 
71. The Senate Judiciary Report on the Act specifically noted that the RFRA was not 
intended to address the government's use and management of federally owned lands 
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outcry over Smith (whose broad language, theoretically, raised a serious 
threat of overlap with mainstream interests) and that over Lyng (which 
approved complete destruction of the religion of several tribes of Native 
Americans but did not threaten such overlap) is telling.72 
The legislative events that followed Smith demonstrate that the issues 
that the minority and the majority face in protecting religious freedom 
rights are really quite different. For example, the House version of the 
RFRA introduced by Representative Charles E. Schumer had 170 cospon- 
sors; the Senate version, sponsored by Senators Edward Kennedy and Or- 
rin Hatch, had at least 58 cosponsors. The AIRFA, sponsored by Repre- 
sentative William B. Richardson (D-NM)73 had two cosponsors. This 
difference cannot be explained by any difference in the power of the 
convictions of those holding the religious claims. Minority religious 
groups and cultures inevitably must rely upon either their own economic 
power or having something in common with the dominant group so that 
in advancing their own interests, the dominant group indirectly advances, 
at least in part, the interests of the minority group. 
The events surrounding passage of the RFRA and the AIRFA make 
clear that one cannot assume that a model based solely upon the major- 
ity's experience will suffice for the minority or even be consistent with 
their varied interests. Culture never confronts the possibility that its 
model is inappropriate for nonwhite or non-Christian religious groups. 
The experiences of members of minority religions and minority cultures 
considered sacred sites by Native American religious adherents. See S. Rep. No. 103-111, 
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 & n.19. 
In April of 1994, President Clinton signed a memorandum that recognized the sacred 
place of eagle feathers in Native American culture and religious practices and directed 
federal executive agencies to work with tribal governments to seek opportunities to 
accommodate Native American religious practices by providing easier access to scarce 
eagle carcasses and parts. See Memorandum on Distribution of Eagle Feathers for Native 
American Religious Purposes, April 29, 1994, 17 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 935 (May 2, 
1994). The Native American Cultural Protection and Free Exercise of Religion Act, S. 
2269, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994) sponsored by Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI) did not 
emerge from committee (see S. 2269, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck File). That 
Act would have provided for the legalization of sacramental use of peyote (now 
accomplished by the AIRFA), access to eagle feathers and ceremonial plants, the 
preservation of religious rights of Native American prisoners, and restrictions on federal 
land use when Native American religious use of sacred sites might be jeopardized. 
72. In response to a news article that suggested Smith was a case with limited impact, 
Michael McConnell pointed out that the broad language of Smith might authorize 
restricting the right to choose priests and ministers, permitting dry counties to ban the use 
of communion wine, permitting the state to force changes in kosher food preparation or 
requiring students to take sex education classes over their parents' objections. See Michael 
W. McConnell, Religion's Privileges Have a Solid Basis in the Constitution, Legal Times, 
Sept. 7, 1992, at 27 (letter to the editor); see also W. John Moore, Religious Rights In The 
Balance, Nat'l J., Aug. 11, 1990, at 1981 (speculating that Smith theoretically could 
authorize government curtailment of circumcision of newborn boys or ritual slaughter 
needed for kosher foods). 
73. S. 578, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck File; H.R. 1308, available in 
LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck File. 
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merely serve to buttress the claim that the barriers to religious freedom 
could be removed if only we overcame our suspicion of any viewpoint that 
is religiously informed. Rather than playing a meaningful part in the reli- 
gious freedom analysis, those outside the mainstream are relegated to 
stage hands in a majority play of religious oppression. 
The point is further demonstrated by Culture's failure to give any 
substantial attention to the law's role as a mediator between religions, a 
point which concerns minority religions regardless of the race of their 
adherents. Often, it is the law that stands between a minority faith or 
culture and that faith or culture's extinction by the majority.74 Instead of 
focusing upon the law as protector, Culture consistently characterizes the 
law as an offender of religion. Culture urges restraint and respect for mi- 
nority faiths by the mainstream. But Culture's arguments for the preserva- 
tion and protection of minority religions from the tyranny of the majority 
are legally anemic. Carter urges the dominant groups to avoid the secu- 
lar grasp for power and advises that "one must be prepared to acknowl- 
edge the evil done in the name of faith, to beg forgiveness for it, and to 
examine the message with care, in order to understand why and how the 
followers of the message went so far astray" (pp. 89-90). As a religious 
person myself, I think that Carter's advice is sound. But Culture offers no 
advice to those whose lives and religion have been wrecked in the name 
of faith. What are these people supposed to do while the dominant 
group is reexamining its message with care? Such post hoc prescriptions 
may purge the majority of its sin, but they will not, unfortunately, remedy 
the lingering effects of a past oppression caused by these ill-conceived 
grasps at power, nor will they provide reliable assurance that the same, or 
even worse, oppression will not recur in the future.75 Some minority 
74. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2222 
(1993) (rejecting state statute prohibiting animal sacrifice that was essential practice in 
minority group faith ritual). 
75. Those who err on the side of separation rather than accommodation in the 
Establishment Clause/Free Exercise Clause balancing act often make this point. I am not, 
however more comfortable with the analogies of Kathleen Sullivan who has described the 
Establishment Clause's relationship to the Free Exercise Clause in terms of a social 
contract to end "the war of all sects against all." According to Sullivan, the Establishment 
Clause "entails the establishment of a civil order." She continues, "Public affairs may no 
longer be conducted as the strongest faith dictates. Minority religions gain from the truce 
not in the sense that their faiths now may be translated into public policy, but in the sense 
that no faith may be." Sullivan, supra note 12, at 198. The social contract metaphor 
assumes agreement that the war between sects (and between sects and the world) is bad 
and should be ended as well as agreement that the ceding of power to the state to mediate 
is the best way to accomplish this goal. Ultimately, whether or not one views the analogy as 
appropriate depends upon one's interpretation of the constitutional contract as well as on 
whether one's religion acknowledges an end to the war-even if one's religion loses-to 
be a valuable result. If one perceives religion as offering only two options-a religious 
"win" or a fight to the finish-it is hard to understand how the religious person would ever 
be deemed to have agreed to give up the right to recognize religious authority as higher 
than the state. By insisting that religion by its very nature answers to a higher authority 
(pp. 41-43), Culture indirectly underscores the problem with such a social contract 
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faiths and cultures may well wish to give the law the credit for the major- 
ity's respect and restraint. 
Because of its narrow focus, Culture often seems oblivious to the fact 
that the positions it takes, while advancing mainstream interests, may be 
antithetical to the interests (religious and otherwise) of minority faith 
groups or minority cultures. For example Culture attacks the purpose 
arm of Lemon, claiming that it promotes suspicion of religious motivation. 
Carter proposes instead that the courts focus upon whether the state ac- 
tion has the effect of promoting religion.76 In so doing, Culture gives no 
consideration to the practical impact that abandoning a "purpose" test 
and adopting an "effects" test would have upon the freedom of minority 
faiths and cultures. Would not such an approach have the effect of shift- 
ing the burden of proof from the state (to prove a secular purpose in 
response to a prima facie case) to members of minority faiths and cultures 
or others who challenge the action under the Establishment Clause (to 
prove a promotional effect)? Is such a result good for religion overall or 
is it simply good for the dominant religions? Does not the secularist's 
challenge, in effect, often vindicate the rights of minority faiths and cul- 
tures?77 Moreover, what is the practical effect of such a test? No doubt 
the adoption of an "effects" test would require a more substantial factual 
investigation than is currently required by the secular purpose standard, 
which relies heavily upon legislative history. Since the cultural and reli- 
gious mainstream controls the arms of the state and is more likely to be 
the beneficiary of any religiously favorable legislation (or at least is less 
likely to suffer significant negative effects), could not one argue that both 
concerns for plurality and efficiency suggest that the state should bear the 
burden of establishing a secular purpose? Does this allocation of the bur- 
den necessarily amount to a suspicion of religion? 
analysis. As its starting point, the analysis requires an assumption that settling for the 
existence of the state without change is better than courting its destruction through 
resistance intended to generate change. 
The social contract analysis has to be viewed with some suspicion by minority faiths 
and cultures that believe that (1) they have not had the opportunity to participate fully in 
the contractual negotiations, (2) their interests were not and are not otherwise 
represented at the bargaining table, and (3) their interests are not represented among the 
contract interpreters. Such an analysis could be devastating to minority group rights and 
interests by counseling restraint with no assurance that the defects in the contract 
formation process and the resulting inequities will ever be acknowledged or rectified. A 
"contract" arising out of (or shall we say imposed under) such nonparticipatory conditions 
might well be viewed as null and void by those excluded. 
Finally, too often a majority's perception of "order" is a minority's view of chaos. The 
act of spreading the chaos around in violation of the majority's alleged social contract has, 
in some circumstances, been proven to have significant value as a catalyst to social contract 
modification. 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. 
77. The fact that many challenges are brought by secularists does not resolve the 
question in favor of accommodationists like Carter. Indeed, given the limited resources of 
many minority faith groups, the secularists' challenge may well serve the important 
purpose of indirectly vindicating the rights of religionists in minority faiths and cultures. 
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Similarly, in hearkening to the original intent behind the religion 
clauses as support for his call for more public religion (pp. 105-06, 
115-20), Culture does not sufficiently consider the fact that at the time 
those clauses were enacted, many racial and cultural groups were not 
among those whose free exercise rights-or other rights-were originally 
intended to be protected. Pure original intent cannot be the basis for 
their free exercise claims.78 
78. In the context of considering whether states are free to establish a religion, Carter 
concedes that relying on original intent alone would not provide the assurances of 
pluralism that he believes the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to ensure (pp. 118-119). 
He thus looks beyond original intent and argues that, in this context, the religion clauses 
must be construed in light of subsequent constitutional amendments and contemporary 
societal concerns. See supra note 35. Culture does not, however, attempt to apply a similar 
argument to the question of whether the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, the Fifth 
Amendment, or other constitutional provisions should be read to prohibit religiously 
motivated racial discrimination. Instead, Carter relies upon the traditional compelling 
interest analysis. He vigorously argues for religious autonomy but concludes that the 
country's commitment to eliminating racial discrimination is surely a compelling enough 
interest to justify the Bob Jones outcome (p. 151). 
But the framing of a right to be free from racial discrimination in terms of a state 
interest may be offensive to some even if suggested by the compelling interest standard. 
The compelling interest test as traditionally framed may well have the indirect and perhaps 
unintended effect of dimming the lights on rights of constitutional stature whenever they 
are balanced against religion, even when those rights may themselves be essential to the 
freedom-religious or otherwise-of the group suffering from the discrimination. This 
denigration of other rights is often accentuated by the fact that the state is often a 
reluctant defender of those rights. 
The Bob Jones case demonstrates these points. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 
461 U.S. 574 (1983). In Bob Jones, the Department of Justice originally took the position 
that the IRS had authority to deny tax-exempt status to religious schools that practiced 
racial discrimination, but it later reversed course under the Reagan Administration. The 
Supreme Court then invited William T. Coleman, Jr., a prominent attorney to appear as 
amicus and to defend the position abandoned by theJustice Department. See, e.g., A True 
Friend of the Court, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1982, at 22. Coleman, an African American, 
argued, inter alia, that the granting of tax-exempt status would constitute significant state 
aid to an organization that practiced racial discrimination in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment and contrary to the Court's holding in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 
(1973), a non-free exercise case in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited state provision of free textbooks to racially discriminatory elementary schools. 
See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgments Below, reprinted in 136 
Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Constitutional Law: 1982 Term Supplement 402-08 (1984) [hereinafter 136 Landmark 
Briefs]. 
In contrast to Coleman's approach, amici composed of predominantly white 
mainstream religious groups took advantage of the opportunity to couch the state's 
interest in terms of "policy" and argued that "the wrongness of racism cannot be the real 
issue in this case" because "the very existence of a religious organization was at issue." See, 
e.g., Brief of the American Baptist Churches in the USA and the United Presbyterian 
Church in the USA, Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3), reprinted in 136 
Landmark Briefs, supra, at 7-9, 14 (arguing that the IRS had exceeded its authority on 
"public policy grounds"). 
BobJones also underscores the problems minority groups face in embracing an original 
intent approach. Coleman's cornerstone case, Norwood, involved state action and the 
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The perspective offered by Culture as evidenced by the discussion 
above is consistently culturally and religiously mainstream. In fact, had 
Culture given significant independent consideration to the unique inter- 
ests of minority groups, the result would not necessarily have been con- 
trary to the view that religion should be accommodated. For example, it 
might have noted that religious organizations may be the primary polit- 
ical and social institutions to which certain cultural groups have access; 
thus, a strict separationist/anti-accommodationist policy could effectively 
bar attempts by these groups to gain the same access to the state's largess 
that is regularly afforded to other groups. In other words, either in es- 
sence or by necessity arising out of minority group exclusion from secular 
institutions, for the respective cultural minority groups in which they 
arise, religious institutions are often an indispensable source of informa- 
tion about the larger world and an indispensable public voice on issues 
deemed by the outside world to be purely secular. The African-American 
Church provides such an example.79 In some cultural communities, reli- 
Fourteenth Amendment. But Bob Jones involved federal action and the Fifth Amendment, 
which was, of course, along with the religion clauses, a part of the original Bill of Rights. 
While the Fifth Amendment contains a Due Process clause, unlike the Fourteenth, it does 
not contain an Equal Protection clause nor could anyone reasonably argue that the 
religious and slaveholding founding fathers and mothers intended that it be interpreted to 
prevent federal racial discrimination in any context, much less in the context of religious 
exercise. After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the decision in Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the courts got around this problem by reading a 
limited equal protection component into the due process provisions of the Fifth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). As Carter himself 
notes, there are other problems with the compelling interest test in the context of its 
applicability to Native American claims. See p. 133 (suggesting that under compelling 
interest test Smith case should have different outcome because states have exempted peyote 
use, but Lyng might have same). See also Martin C. Loesch, The First Americans and the 
"Free" Exercise of Religion, 18 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 313 (1993) (under compelling interest 
test, for historical reasons, governmental interest will always be deemed to outweigh Native 
American religious claims). 
79. African-American churches and mosques have long been at the center of 
religious, political, and cultural life for that community as is witnessed by the number of 
African-American educational institutions that found their beginnings in religious 
organizations, the number of African-American political leaders that have emerged from 
religious groups, and the involvement of African-American religious groups in "political" 
affairs, including the Civil Rights movement. (The "Brown" in Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954) was the Reverend Oliver Brown). Malcolm X also noted the beginnings 
of the Black Muslim movement as a religious movement which evolved into a "religious- 
political hybrid" after some in orthodox Islam rejected the Black Muslims as true 
practitioners and outsiders attempted to argue that the movement was political rather than 
religious "so that they could charge us with sedition and subversion." Malcolm X: The 
Last Speeches 174-75 (Bruce Perry ed., 1989). He further noted that "we wanted our 
religion" but "[w]e realized at the same time we had a problem in this society that went 
beyond religion." Id. at 173-74. The fact is that the "church" is the only organization that 
African Americans have historically been permitted to control. See generally C. Eric 
Lincoln & Lawrence Mamiya, The Black Church in the African American Experience 
200-01 (1990) (noting that religion was the only institutional area where slaves were able 
to exercise some degree of freedom). Thus, the church fulfilled needs that were not being 
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gion may be so inseparable from the ethnic and political culture of the 
community itself, that a policy against accommodation may have implica- 
tions for the minority culture beyond those that it would have for the 
majority culture. Such a policy may in fact threaten the very existence of 
the minority culture. One might consider, for example, Lyng's discussion 
of religion's central role in the cultural life of the various Native Ameri- 
can communities.80 The problem with arguments such as these is that 
they cannot be made by mainstream communities-and, if made too 
loudly, they might even be opposed by them. 
B. Political Preaching vs. Politically Correct Preaching 
Nowhere is Carter's mainstream focus more apparent than in a chap- 
ter called "Political Preaching," in which he criticizes the political activ- 
ism of some religionists. According to Carter, "political preachers" are 
"spiritual leaders who try to explain to their flocks what God wants them 
to do in the political world" (p. 70). Carter fully agrees that religion 
should inform politics (p. 80). However, in this chapter he complains of 
" [t] he seeming unwillingness of politically active religionists to accept the 
possibility that their religious traditions might correctly teach a word of 
God contrary to their secular predilections" (p. 68).81 Bemoaning the 
prevalence of such preachers, Carter notes: 
[A]s the servant of politics [,] religion is very much in the public 
square.... By calling upon the word of God in service of every 
known cause, our society diminishes the weight and the force of 
met by the larger community and still does. Conversely, one could argue that political 
control such as that exercised by white Protestants over the society at large provides fertile 
ground for what is perceived as a privatized view of religion where politics and religion 
occupy separate spheres. See, e.g., Teitel, supra note 39, at 763 & nn.50-51. A policy that 
prohibits any state involvement with religious organizations necessarily embraces the 
privatized model, and a model that assumes political power without explanation as to why 
it is the appropriate model without acknowledging that it is based upon an assumption that 
there are no significant barriers to cultural integration into the secular world, and without 
acknowledging that cultural integration may indeed threaten the existence of some 
minority religious communities. 
Every debate about the separation of church and state must begin from a theological 
assumption about what religion is. For quite a long time assumptions on the topic have 
been based upon a model that is inappropriate for groups who do not share the attributes 
of this country's dominant cultural and religious groups. 
80. Calling the case a "conflict between two disparate cultures," Justice Brennan 
noted the inseparability of religion from the cultural life of the Native Americans in Lyng 
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439, 459-60, 473 (1988) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Brief for the Indian Respondents, Lyng (No. 86-1013), 
available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File; Brief of Amici Curiae National Congress of 
American Indians et al., Lyng (No. 86-1013), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs 
File; see also Vine Deloria, Jr., God is Red: A Native View of Religion 46-217 (1994) 
(selected differences between the various Native American traditions andJudeo-Christian 
traditions); Loesch, supra note 78, at 360-65 (same). 
81. It should be noted that Carter sanctions conservatives and liberals in this chapter 
although I would argue that liberals bear the brunt of his criticisms. 
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religious belief. Indeed, by readily supposing that the word of 
God is so malleable that it can (by coincidence) support every 
cause that one's politics also happen to support, we undermine 
the idea of faith as a source of moral guidance. (P. 80.)82 
The problem with political preaching, according to Carter, is that 
the political preacher allows politics to guide theology, rather than vice 
versa (pp. 67, 70).83 Significantly, Culture concedes that political preach- 
ers may be sincere in their proclamations, that they may well "believe that 
the political positions they press are the positions that God would want 
them to press" (p. 70). But Culture argues that "the political preacher's 
sincerity is not enough to save political preaching" (p. 70). 
Carter contends that these religionists, i.e., political preachers, hurt 
the cause of "restoring religion to the place of honor that it deserves" (p. 
68). Indeed, according to Carter, they themselves trivialize religion. 
This chapter demonstrates strikingly the inherent inconsistencies in 
Carter's approach and the extent to which his views are rooted in cultural 
and theological assumptions that are not universally held. In earlier 
chapters he has informed us that the devoutly religious have difficulty 
separating their religious selves from their public selves (p. 8). But here 
he tells us that we should be suspicious when one's politics and one's 
theology always match up. In the prior chapters, he has argued that the 
religious must be free to dictate their own theology (p. 34). But here he 
offers readers what comes across as a litmus test for theologically sound 
religious discourse: 
Matters become troublesome . . . when one's theology always 
ends up squaring precisely with one's politics. At that point, 
there is a reason to suspect that far from trying to discern God's 
will and follow it in the world, the political preacher is first de- 
ciding what path to take in the world and then looking for evi- 
dence that God agrees. (P. 70.)84 
Lurking behind this statement appears to be an assumption that it is a 
universal dictate that one's political views and one's theological views 
should occupy completely distinct spheres. As in the case of Culture's dis- 
cussions of the Lyng and Smith opinions, here again Culture speaks to a 
particular theological viewpoint, one that is uniquely mainstream. Cer- 
82. "Political Preaching," says Carter, is the "flip side" of the trivialization of religion, 
but here, the religiously faithful are the trivializers (pp. 67-68). This point suggests that 
the trivialization of religion of which Carter originally spoke was being done by the 
"nonfaithful," and seems to conflict with his earlier statement that the faithful are a 
majority in America and even a majority in Congress and that this majority is being forced 
to abandon its religious self. 
83. One wonders whether it is appropriate for the political to be very religious-but 
not for the religious to be very political. Carter recognizes what he describes as a 
contemporary trend in hermeneutics-that interpreters get out of the text only that which 
they put into it-Carter rejects the view as too "nihilistic" for the faithful who take divine 
guidance seriously, as Carter certainly does (p. 73). 
84. Such a view, Carter says, is problematic because diversity is not acknowledged (p. 
71). Incorrect political views are seen as indicating a lack of commitment (p. 71). 
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tainly, Carter must be right that religion is serious business. But Carter's 
formula for religiously correct discourse is flawed, particularly when ap- 
plied to those outside the mainstream. 
The problem with Carter's approach is strikingly revealed by his cas- 
ual and haphazard half-sentence reference to liberation theology: 
This is the essence of the problem of political preaching, as I 
have named the effort to use God's name to bend one's flock to 
the correct political view. It is the problem with George Bush's 
effort to link God to America's victory in the Cold War, and it is 
the problem with much that passes for liberation theology. To insist 
that God is, in effect, one of us-that He is our person, instead 
of we being His people-is not much different from the trivial- 
ization inherent in the rather offensive slogan that occasionally 
adorns the bumpers of cars from North Carolina, where a minor 
form of godhead is conferred upon the University of North Car- 
olina's blue-suited basketball team, the Tar Heels. Says the 
bumper sticker, "IF GOD ISN'T A TAR HEEL, THEN WHY IS 
THE SKY CAROLINA BLUE?" God, it seems, not only roots for 
the right countries and the right ideologies, but for the right 
basketball team as well. (Pp. 81-82) (emphasis added.)85 
Much that passes for liberation theology? No doubt many of Carter's 
readers have not the faintest idea of what liberation theology is. Of 
course, now they need not find out because by placing a half-sentence 
reference to "much" of it between a politician's empty incantation and a 
basketball fan's bumper sticker, Culture tells them that it is not important. 
In fact, liberation theology is an umbrella term for a wide-ranging 
and varied scheme of theological efforts to refashion the traditional 
Eurocentric image of God that has dominated Christian religious dis- 
course and practice. In its various forms, it claims that Christianity's true 
essence is the alleviation of suffering and oppression. It also claims that, 
contrary to this purpose, traditional religious discourse and doctrine have 
been used as instruments of the state, preserving the power structures 
within the status quo contrary to God's will.86 
The theme of liberation within Christianity has been raised by many. 
For example, in Latin America, oppressed communities challenged the 
85. Carter's citation of the ailment with liberation theology-its claim that God is one 
of us rather than we are one of God's-would be objected to by many liberation 
theologians who would argue that they make both assertions. Furthermore, his frontal 
attack on the lighthearted Tar Heels slogan demonstrates the extent to which Culture is 
trapped in Carter's personal vision of what religion ought to be and how the "religious" 
ought to conduct themselves, and displays a revealingly Northeastern failure to appreciate 
the slogan's Southern context. 
86. See, e.g., Liberation Theology: A Documentary History xiii-xiv (Alfred T. 
Hennelly ed., 1992) (" [L] iberation theology ... integrate [s] ... the struggle for justice as 
an essential feature of every method, theme, and context of theology ... [ and] unmask[s] 
. . . oppressive ... attitudes in both society and the Christian churches."). 
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established religion of the conquerors as employing Christianity as ajusti- 
fication for oppression.87 
In 1971, Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutierrez explained the phe- 
nomenon as it had been revealing itself over a number of years in Latin 
America. In so doing, he addressed the concerns of those who argued 
that liberation theologians were straying from the language of traditional 
theology in their insistence that Christianity had a message about political 
life. 
To place oneself in the perspective of the Kingdom means to 
participate in the struggle for the liberation of those oppressed 
by others. This is what many Christians who have committed 
themselves to the Latin American revolutionary process have be- 
gun to experience. If this option seems to separate them from 
the Christian community, it is because many Christians, intent 
on domesticating the Good News, see them as wayward and per- 
haps even dangerous. If they are not always able to express in 
appropriate terms the profound reasons for their commitment, 
it is because the theology in which they were formed-and 
which they share with other Christians-has not produced the 
categories necessary to express this option, which seeks to re- 
spond creatively to the new demands of the Gospel and of the 
oppressed and exploited peoples of this continent.88 
But Gutierrez did not believe that the fact that the expressions of 
those involved in the struggle for liberation arose out of political need 
rendered the theology thus formed invalid. 
[I]n their commitments, and even in their attempts to explain 
them, there is a greater understanding of the faith, greater faith, 
greater fidelity to the Lord than in the 'orthodox' doctrine ... 
of reputable Christian circles. This doctrine is supported by au- 
thority and much publicized because of access to social commu- 
nications media, but it is so static and devitalized that it is not 
even strong enough to abandon the Gospel. It is the Gospel 
which is disowning it.89 
In this country, the theme of liberation was also present in Christian 
expressions by slave communities deprived of their right to practice an- 
cestral religions.90 As is obvious from a cursory review of his speeches, 
87. In Latin America, liberation theology was largely a critique of traditional Roman 
Catholic doctrine which was the dominant religious heritage of the conquerors. The 
forerunners of formal liberation theology dated back to the time of the Spanish conquest 
and its resulting massive enslavement and oppression of Amerindians by conquistadors. 
See Liberation Theology, supra note 86, at xvii. 
88. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation 203 
(Sister Caridad Inda & John Eagleson trans. & eds., 1973). This book is an English 
translation of Teoligia de la Liberaci6n Perpectivas (1971). 
89. Id. 
90. See AlbertJ. Raboteau, Slave Religion 218-19 (1978); Gayraud S. Wilmore, Black 
Religion and Black Radicalism 37 (1972). The theme of liberation is evident in Negro 
spirituals and gospel songs. See, e.g., Lincoln & Mamiya, supra note 79, at 346-81 
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the liberation theme is a dominant one in the work of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.91 But the term "liberation theology" became a term of art in this 
country when academic voices adopted the term. The formative voice 
was that of James Cone who published Black Theology and Black Power in 
1969, and then, in 1970, his classic work, A Black Theology of Liberation. In 
1986, he described his approach to writing the latter book: 
I was completely unaware of the beginnings of liberation 
theology in the Third World, especially in Latin America. 
Neither did I know much about the theme of liberation in Afri- 
can-American history and culture. Unfortunately, my formal theo- 
logical and historical knowledge was primarily limited to the dominant 
perspectives of North America and Europe [emphasis added]. But, 
despite these limitations, I was determined to speak a liberating 
word for and to African-American Christians, using the theologi- 
cal resources at my disposal. I did not have time to do the theo- 
logical and historical research needed to present a "balanced" 
perspective on the problem of racism in America. Black men, 
women, and children were being shot and imprisoned for assert- 
ing their right to a dignified existence. Others were wasting away 
in ghettoes, dying from filth, rats, and dope, as white and black 
ministers preached about a blond, blue-eyed Jesus who came to 
make us all just like him. I had to speak a different word, not 
just as a black person but primarily as a theologian. I felt then, as 
I still do, that if theology had nothing to say about black suffer- 
ing and resistance, I could not be a theologian.92 
Cone thus argued, as did Latin American liberation theologians, that 
"[t] here can be no Christian theology that is not identified unreservedly 
with those who are humiliated and abused."93 For Cone, as a black Amer- 
(discussing themes in black religious music). Indeed, Frederick Douglass urged that one 
could not be both Christian and a supporter of slavery, and that allegiance to God required 
efforts to overthrow slavery. See Pennsylvania Freedman, Aug. 12, 1847 ("Brethren, Rouse 
The Church:" An Address Delivered in Philadelphia, Penn. on Aug. 6, 1847) and National 
Anti-Slavery Standard, 7 June 1849 ("An Abolitionist Measure of American Churches and 
the Free Soil party:" An Address Delivered in Boston Massachusetts on 30 May 1849), in 2 
The Frederick Douglass Papers 90, 198 (John W. Blassingame ed., 1982). 
91. See James H. Cone, Martin Luther King, Jr., Black Theology-Black Church, in 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement 409, 412 (David J. Garrow ed., 
1989); Cornel West, Black Theology of Liberation As Critique of Capitalist Civilization, in 
Black Theology, A Documentary History 410; infra note 95 (tracing history of black 
theology of liberation and noting King's contribution). 
92. James H. Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation: Twentieth Anniversary Edition 
xii (3rd ed. 1990) [hereinafter Cone, A Black Theology]. Cone and other liberation 
theologians were influenced by numerous African-American predecessors as well as by 
European writers such as German theologians Jfirgen Moltmann and Johannes B. Metz. 
See James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed, 126-32 (1975) [hereinafter Cone, God of the 
Oppressed]. 
93. Cone, A Black Theology, supra note 92, at 1. For example, using scripture, Cone 
argued that God selected the Israelites to be his people because of their oppressed 
condition, and that throughout the Bible, scripture's prevailing theme is God meeting the 
oppressed and liberating them from their oppression. See id. at 1-4. 
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ican who began his quest to redefine theology during the Civil Rights era, 
the community of the oppressed was epitomized by black America. 
Cone's critique was harsh (some might prefer "honest") and sent white 
theologians and a considerable number of African-American ones into 
fits.94 
Out of these early developments emerged a virtual explosion of polit- 
ical action, scholarship, and change challenging traditional Eurocentric 
notions of Christianity and insisting on revisions to the predominantly 
European version of Christianity's history and its present purpose. Soon, 
other communities that viewed themselves on the underside of political 
and theological life in this country began to reexamine the relevance of 
traditional western Christian doctrine to their own lives (pp. 77-78).95 
Today, there is not a prominent mainstream seminary in the country that 
does not at least recognize the themes of liberation theology as worthy of 
94. Cone has critiqued his own early work, identifying a number of weaknesses, 
including a failure to incorporate a gender analysis, a negative overreaction to white racism 
(as if "the sole basis for Black Theology were racism among whites"), a failure to 
incorporate a social and economic analysis, and a lack of knowledge of the struggles in 
Latin America. SeeJames H. Cone, For My People: Black Theology and the Black Church 
78-98 (1985); Cone, A Black Theology, supra note 92, at xv-xix. 
95. A sampling of readings under the black theology umbrella (in addition to the 
material previously cited) is found in Black Theology: A Documentary History James H. 
Cone & Gayraud S. Wilmore eds., 2d ed. 1993) (Two volume set containing writings from 
1966 to 1992 and including writings by African-American Women. The set also includes an 
extensive bibliography). 
Writings by African-American women (sometimes called "Womanist Theology") 
include Jacquelyn Grant, White Women's Christ and Black Women's Jesus: Feminist 
Christology and Womanist Response (1989); Renita J. Weems, Just a Sister Away: A 
Womanist Vision of Women's Relationships in the Bible (1988); Delores S. Williams, Sisters 
in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk (1993); see also 2 Black 
Theology: A Documentary History, supra, at 257-351 (chapter on womanist theology 
including works by various womanist writers). 
Other American female perspectives include Christian Feminism: Visions of a New 
Humanity Judith L. Weidman ed., 1984) (collection of essays by feminist theologians); 
Mary Daly, Beyond God The Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation (1973) 
(feminist Catholic perspective); Rosemary R. Ruether, Liberation Theology: Human Hope 
Confronts Christian History and American Power (1972) (a feminist theologian's 
perspective on emerging black theology, Latin American liberation theology, and feminist 
theology); Rosemary R. Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (10th 
Anniv. ed. 1993); Rosemary R. Ruether, Womanguides: Readings Toward a Feminist 
Theology (1985). 
An excellent sampling of the writings tracing the development of liberation theology 
in Latin America is found in Liberation Theology: A Documentary History, supra note 92. 
One can also look under the names of noted Latin American liberation theologians, 
including Leonardo Boff (Brazil); Miguez Bonino (Argentina); Paulo Freire (Brazil); 
Gustavo Gutierrez (Peru); Juan Luis Segundo (Uruguay); Jon Sobrino (El Salvador). For 
other non-American perspectives, see, e.g., Aloysius Pieris, An Asian Theology of 
Liberation (1988) (Sri Lanka). 
The vast body of scholarly work that falls under the "liberation theology" umbrella, 
not to mention pulpit preaching that carries on the liberation tradition, demonstrates the 
problems with Culture's reference. 
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study, and many seek to represent the perspectives of liberation theolo- 
gians on their faculty.96 
Carter's complaint-that one should be suspicious when politics and 
theology match up-cuts to the heart of "political" theology. By contrast, 
without apology, James Cone traced the birth of Black Theology directly 
to the African-American church's involvement in the Civil Rights 
Movement: 
When King and other black church persons began to relate the 
Christian gospel to the struggle for racial justice in American 
society, the great majority of white churches and their theolo- 
gians denied that such a relationship existed. Conservative 
white Christians claimed that religion and politics did not mix. 
Liberal white Christians, with few exceptions during the 1950s 
and early '60s, remained silent on the theme or they advocated 
a form of gradualism that denounced boycotts, sit-ins, and free- 
dom rides.97 
He continued: 
Contrary to popular opinion now, King was not well received by 
the white American church establishment when he inaugurated 
the civil rights movement with the Montgomery bus boycott in 
1955. Because blacks received little or no theological support 
from white churches and their theologians (who were preoccu- 
pied with Barth, Bultmann, and the death-of-God controversy!), 
blacks themselves had to search deeply into their own history in 
order to find a theological basis for their prior political commit- 
ment to liberate the black poor.98 
It would not be hard to see how liberation theologians might view Cul- 
ture's singular reference to liberation theology as an insulting one. The 
very brevity of the reference speaks volumes about the focus of Culture. 
While Carter says one should be suspicious when politics and reli- 
gion match up, theologians who see liberation and justice as the essence 
96. It should be noted that not every tradition that embraces a liberation theme also 
embraces the "liberation theology" label. In the African-American church, the label is 
more easily embraced in the North than in the more conservative churches of the South. 
See Lincoln & Mamiya, supra note 79, at 178-82. However, Lincoln and Mamiya claim 
that the theme of liberation (or the "prophetic" theme) as demonstrated in the work of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. is present to some degree in all predominantly African-American 
churches. See id. at 12. Since Carter references liberation theology as an "ideology" (p. 
81), the extent to which his comments on political preaching as a whole would also negate 
the less academic tradition of prophetic preaching is unclear. Also, more recent scholarly 
manifestations of black theology have been criticized as far too subdued in their criticisms 
when compared to the scholarship of the '60s and '70s. Noting that "[t]he anger of 
oppressed young Blacks is conspicuously absent from [much of recent Black theology]," 
Cone has asked, "[i]s it because [African-American academic] theologians have moved 
into a White academic suburb and thereby have lost touch with ordinary people?" James 
H. Cone, General Introduction, in 2 Black Theology: A Documentary History, supra note 
95, at 1, 9. 
97. Cone, supra note 94, at 7. 
98. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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of Christianity's message and who perceive a diversion away from that 
message in traditional mainstream theology might argue that it is when 
theology and politics do not match up that one should be suspicious.99 
Indeed, did not the theology of Martin Luther King seem always to 
square precisely with his politics? Should we then conclude that King 
first decided what path to take and then looked for evidence that God 
agreed with him? And even if we do so conclude, does that finding invali- 
date his theology? Carter does not intend to include King in his critique 
(pp. 38, 41)-but how does one tell the difference between appropriate 
and inappropriate theology?'00 
And what of Carter's defense in a prior chapter of Operation Res- 
cue's right to call upon religion as an appropriate basis for political ac- 
tion against abortion (pp. 41, 234)? Why is not that same defense avail- 
able to liberation theologians who call upon religion as the basis for 
social action or to others who Carter lumps together as political preach- 
ers? And finally, what of his past cry of trivialization? How can it be justi- 
fied against his slicing reference to liberation theology or the passage in 
Culture that excoriates a young female preacher whose sermon addressed 
the civil strife in El Salvador and Nicaragua?'0' It is difficult not to won- 
99. Cone has warned that theology is created by human beings with reference to 
particular places and times. There is, according to Cone and other liberation theologians, 
a truth to be discerned, but the process of discernment is flawed with human error, with 
the necessary result that human expressions of theology must often be reassessed and 
redefined. See Cone, God of the Oppressed, supra note 92, at 39. 
100. Ironically, Carter dismisses the sincerity of the political preacher, but he is 
willing to consider sincerity when dealing with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In a different 
chapter he states: 
Certainly King and other religious leaders showed no reluctance to claim for their 
positions an "exclusive alignment with the Almighty." Nor is there any reason 
that they should have been reluctant, provided that they had come in a prayerful 
way to a sincere belief that they had discovered the will of God. (Pp. 48-49) 
(emphasis added.) 
Of course, one might well ask how Carter or any of us can discern that an admittedly 
sincere preacher has not come in a prayerful way to the belief that he or she has discovered 
the will of God. Compare here Carter's favorable report of the story of white feminist 
Gloria Steinem being asked howJudaism led her to feminism and Steinem's reply that it 
was the other way around (p. 59). 
101. Carter describes in mocking terms a first time visit to a church and a fledgling 
female preacher's attempt to deliver a message in which she attempted to tie the political 
situation in Nicaragua and El Salvador to a vision of God's plan (pp. 69-70). At the time, 
both countries were caught in the grip of civil war and the preacher was apparently 
suggesting that God favored one side of that conflict. Carter refers to the preacher as "a 
sort of left-wing Oliver North," calls her sermon "no masterpiece of coherence," and says, 
"She wanted to set us straight on Central America because, she feared, many among us 
were misunderstanding God's plan and therefore falling into sin" (p. 69). Having thus 
ridiculed the young preacher (for no apparent useful purpose), Carter provides his 
readers with a psychological profile informing us that "the preacher in question had no 
conception of the possibility of a faith not guided by her prior political commitments." Says 
Carter, "For her, politics should lead faith . . ." (p. 69). Apparently, this profile was based 
upon the twenty minutes or so that Carter listened to the preacher's sermon. 
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der whether Carter disagrees with the approach of political preachers 
merely because he disagrees with the points of view they espouse. 
Carter's failure to recognize the difficulty in the passing reference or 
in applying his faith formula reflects the same trend present in his discus- 
sions of the Smith and Lyng cases. Culture's focus is upon the majority 
religions and cultures.102 Thus, he ignores the political and social con- 
text in which liberation theologians believe they operate. Indeed, when 
liberation theology is stripped of its cultural and political context - as in 
the case of Smith and Lyng - something significant is lost in the transla- 
tion. And it is this something political and cultural context - that 
Carter repeatedly ignores. 
It is this mainstream focus that leads Carter to slip into criticizing 
approaches that differ from the Eurocentric model of what "preaching" 
should be. Certainly, the question that Culture poses is not which theol- 
ogy is right or which theology is politically correct. Rather, Carter pur- 
ports to argue for maximum freedom for sincere religionists to speak 
about God. He concedes that many political preachers are sincere. If the 
question is access to the public square, then the theology of these libera- 
tion theologians-or of other sincere political preachers-deserves no 
less respect than Carter's own theology. 
Thus, Carter accomplishes in his chapter on "Political Preaching" 
something curiously similar to that for which he criticizes liberals 
throughout the rest of his book. He argues against the use of certain 
God-talk in the public square because it is God-talk.'03 He imposes a stan- 
dard that restricts public religious expressions to particular topics. These 
are odd statements in a book whose theme is the celebration of public 
discourse about religion. Carter's vigorous attack on liberals in prior 
chapters is interesting irony in light of his willingness to equate the claims 
102. Consider the words of Alistair Kee concerning Christian theology that bears a 
political message: 
[T]he most obvious characteristic of political theology is that it is biased. For 
most of its history theology has been biased toward the political right: nor was 
this challenged. Political theology is biased toward the left: why should that be 
challenged? But there is more to it than a simple choosing of political allegiance. 
In the gospels Jesus is biased towards the left: he takes his place with those who 
are certainly not the king's men. He associates with the poor and despised rather 
than with the rich and influential.... He takes sides apparently because God has 
taken sides.... Political theology is biased because Jesus was biased. 
Alistair Kee, Preface to A Political Reader in Theology xi (Alistair Kee ed., 1974). Cornel 
West has cited Black Theology's claim that God is aligned with the oppressed as one of the 
most positive aspects of Black Theology. See Cornel West, Black Theology of Liberation as 
a Critique of Capitalist Civilization, in 2 Black Theology: A Documentary History, supra 
note 95, at 410, 416. 
103. It cannot be that only a fellow religionist has standing to issue critiques of the 
religious and that therefore Carter has unique standing. 
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of liberation theologians to a claim that God supports the New York 
Mets.'04 
In short, Culture evinces a tendency to view the world solely through 
the lens of the dominant groups in our religious and political culture, 
while purporting to represent the interests of all. Unfortunately, that 
lens automatically brings to the foreground those images that are consis- 
tent with and affirming of the dominant group's life experiences. At the 
same time, the lens merges into the background all images that are for- 
eign to and critical of the dominant group's perspective. Using this lens, 
Culture is far too preoccupied with not offending the sensibilities of liber- 
als and conservatives in the book-buying marketplace to help its audience 
appreciate the legal compromises that must be obtained when balancing 
rights in a diverse culture. Thus, Culture plays to a mainstream audience 
eager to champion their own causes-and to blame external forces for 
their woes-but far less willing to conduct self-examination or to con- 
front the difficult issues that underlie debates over the proper line of 
separation between church and state. 
IV. CULTURAL MYTHS AND TELEPHONE FAITH 
In earlier sections I noted the weakness of Culture's dominant 
theme-that the religious are prohibited from engaging in God-talk in 
the public square. I also noted that to strengthen its case, Culture re- 
sorted to trivializing the law and inadvertently, to trivializing religious tra- 
ditions that are outside its own vision of what religion should be. 
In this section, I further address the problems with the theme, con- 
sidering as examples two myths that Culture uses to support its theory of 
exclusion. The myths are 1) that in the past, liberals embraced the Civil 
Rights Movement and that now they engage in hypocrisy when they criti- 
cize conservatives' God-talk; and 2) that today the religionist is treated 
worse than other previously excluded groups in the public square. I ar- 
gue that these myths confirm the reality of a particular slice of America, 
but that close examination reveals that they are problematic as a basis for 
a formula to preserve religious freedom because they do not incorporate 
104. Interestingly enough, in the footnotes at the end of the book, Carter cites the 
work of some feminist theologians as he discusses internal battles over the status of women 
in the Episcopal church. He does not identify these persons to his readers as "liberation 
theologians," but he accepts some of these scholars' challenges to the traditional 
interpretations of the Biblical book of Genesis that ascribe hierarchy of Adam over Eve. At 
the same time, Carter argues that other scriptural passages are not so easily subject to 
reinterpretation (pp. 289-91 & n.l). Since most view feminist theology as fitting under 
the liberation theology umbrella, see supra note 95, one might ask why Carter did not take 
more care to link the references. It is also signficiant that Carter was willing to devote a 
page-and-a-half long footnote to illuminating his discussion of the majority's gender 
critiques of the Christian church but very little time to the racial and class critiques of the 
church's approaches that other liberation theologians have made. I do not ascribe any ill 
intent on his part, but I view it as just another example of his focus, which reflects the 
perspective and interests of the majority. 
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the perspectives of minority groups. I demonstrate again that Culture 
continues a trend of defining a particular vision of the world-the vision 
of the majority-as a universal truth. 
Secondly, I consider an inherent conflict within the trivialization the- 
sis: that the faithful care about religion, but they do not express their 
faithfulness in public. I argue that a theory of religious freedom that 
hangs upon this precipice raises dangerous concerns for both law and 
religion. 
A. Cultural Myths 
Culture uses the Civil Rights Movement to buttress the argument that 
we have moved away from God-talk. It claims that liberals embraced the 
religious rhetoric of the Civil Rights Movement (pp. 60, 64-65, 227-30), 
an observation that enables Carter to argue that liberals are now being 
inconsistent when they complain about conservative God-talk. The claim 
of liberal embrace is presented as if it is a well accepted truth in need of 
no substantiation (pp. 60, 64-65, 227-30). Of course, whether or not 
one accepts Carter's point as gospel depends on one's perspective. 
Carter restricts the religious language in the movement to the early mod- 
erate approach of King. Even in hindsight, one must admit a far different 
reaction to the religious language found in the arguments of the Black 
Muslims, or even to Christian approaches like James Cone's.'05 There is 
another less laudatory view of white liberal receptiveness to religious lan- 
guage within the movement and to its message.'06 
105. In fact, Malcolm X argued that the credit for white liberal acceptance of the 
language of blacks perceived as moderate goes to black nationalists whose views they 
rejected and feared. See, e.g., Malcolm X, Speech at Corn Hill Methodist Church, 
Rochester, New York, February 16, 1965, in Malcolm X: The Last Speeches 173 (Bruce 
Perry ed., 1989). 
One might wonder why the distinction between "toleration" and "respect" that Carter 
insisted upon in earlier chapters, see supra note 14, is not drawn upon as Carter claims that 
liberal whites hypocritically accepted civil rights religious language. In other words, was 
the alleged liberal acceptance mere tolerance or was it the "respect" that Carter earlier 
insisted upon? And if it was only tolerance, then how is that approach inconsistent with 
the alleged treatment of conservative religionists today? In both cases, the value of religion 
is measured by its usefulness as a tool for secular service. 
106. Martin Luther King, Jr. himself often complained that the white liberals or 
moderates were not supporting the movement in significant enough numbers. 
For example, in 1964 he noted the silence of "moderate" and "decent" whites in 
Birmingham. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait, in A Testament of Hope: 
The Essential Writings Of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 518, 528 (James M. Washington, Jr. 
ed., 1986) [hereinafter Testament of Hope]. He also noted the "estrangement" of white 
liberals from the movement and a paternalism that made them uncomfortable with playing 
a secondary role. See Martin Luther King, Jr., A Testament of Hope, in Testament of 
Hope, supra, at 313, 316. Of white northern liberals he complained: 
[T] here is a dire need today for a liberalism that is truly liberal. What we are 
witnessing today in so many northern communities is a sort of quasi liberalism 
which is based on the principal of looking sympathetically at all sides .... It is a 
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Even if one were to agree with Carter's version of history, the claim 
of hypocrisy by liberals falters for yet another reason. It is indisputable 
that the language of the Civil Rights Movement was not exclusively reli- 
gious. Indeed, King and others used both the secular language of reason 
and religious authority to make their arguments, even though, certainly, 
in King's private view, the religious mandate alone was sufficient. King 
frequently cited secular reasons for the outcomes he sought and often 
relied upon the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence and 
other acts of the state as support for his cause.'07 The language of the 
liberalism that is so objectively analytical that it is not subjectively committed. It is 
a liberalism which is neither hot nor cold but lukewarm. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Give Us The Ballot - We Will Transform The South, in Testament 
of Hope, supra, at 197, 199. 
In his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, King responded to an open letter from 
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clerics in Birmingham calling on blacks to cease their 
peaceful demonstrations and to obey the police and the courts. See Birmingham News, 
April 13, 1963, at 2. Although he noted that he rarely responds to criticism, he indicated 
that he was responding in this case because he believed the writers to be "men of genuine 
good will." King expressed his anguish over those who complained that civil rights 
questions were "social issues with which the gospel has no real concern." Martin Luther 
King,Jr., Letter from a Birmingham CityJail, in Testament of Hope, supra, at 289, 299. He 
stated further: 
In the midst of blatant injustices inflicted upon the Negro, I have watched white 
churches stand on the sideline and merely mouth pious irrelevancies and 
sanctimonious trivialities. 
* * * 
I have traveled the length and breadth of Alabama, Mississippi and all the other 
southern states .... Over and over again I have found myself asking: "What kind 
of people worship here? Who is their God?["] 
* * * 
Yes, I see the church as the body of Christ. But, oh! How we have blemished and 
scarred [the body of Christ] through social neglect and fear of being 
nonconformists. 
* * * 
The contemporary church is often a weak, ineffectual voice with an uncertain 
sound. It is so often the arch-supporter of the status quo. Far from being 
disturbed by the presence of the church, the power structure of the average 
community is consoled by the church's silent and often vocal sanction of things as 
they are. 
Id. at 299-300. 
King certainly acknowledged that there were outstanding examples of whites who 
offered aid in the struggle, but the large majority of liberals and moderates seemed either 
uninterested or unwilling to risk the ostracism that would follow from open support of the 
movement. 
107. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in Testament of Hope, supra 
note 106, at 217 (referring to the Constitution and Declaration of Independence as part of 
"a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir" and noting a "dream that one 
day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed-we hold these truths 
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal"). 
King was indeed fortunate that he shared in common with the founding fathers a 
religious concept of a creator that permitted him to manipulate the secular language of 
reason so that it confirmed the values in the language of his religion-and that he had the 
talent to perform this translation. Would one whose culture or religious tradition diverged 
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Civil Rights Movement was not, then, exclusively religious language, 
although it was heavily religious. An assumed liberal acceptance of Civil 
Rights religious language does not prove or disprove the case for accept- 
ance of arguments based on religious authority alone. 
Another cultural myth is found in the argument that the religionist is 
treated worse than other groups in terms of access to the public square. 
Here Culture appears to create a hypothetical generic religious person. 
Then, Carter asks us to compare that person's freedom to speak with the 
freedom experienced by other groups. 
If [a public] school's teachings are offensive to you because you 
are gay or black or disabled, the chances are that the school will 
at least give you a hearing and, if it does not, that many liberals 
will flock to your side and you will find a sympathetic ear in the 
media. But if you do not like the way the school talks about 
religion, or if you believe that the school is inciting your chil- 
dren to abandon their religion, you will probably find that the 
media will mock you, the liberal establishment will announce 
that you are engaged in censorship, and the courts will toss you 
out on your ear. (P. 52.) 
Either Culture is speaking only to white, nondisabled, heterosexual reli- 
gionists or Carter actually believes that this question is an easy call.'08 
The request that I, as an African-American religious person, weigh my 
to a greater degree from that of the mainstream (or one with less talent than King) be able 
to find a similar secular or religious translational hook? 
Interestingly, with respect to the hypocrisy claim, John Rawls argues in Political 
Liberalism, published after Culture went to press, that his theory of liberalism would not 
eliminate the heavily religious discourse of the civil rights or abolition movements from 
public debates. SeeJohn Rawls, Political Liberalism 250 (1993). Religious language would 
be acceptable to the extent that it affirmed public values of justice. Rawls states that 
abolitionists who argued on religious grounds against the institution of slavery "supported 
the clear conclusions of public reason" as found in principles of justice. Id. at 249-50. 
According to Rawls, the same is true of the language of Martin Luther King, Jr. "except 
that King could appeal-as the abolitionists could not-to the political values expressed in 
the Constitution correctly understood." Id. at 250. "Religious doctrines clearly underlie 
King's views and are important in his appeals. Yet they are expressed in general terms; and 
they fully support constitutional values in accord with public reason." Id. at 250 n.39. 
Carter might still complain that Rawls's approach places religious autonomy at the 
mercy of secular predisposition. On the other hand, Carter clearly concedes a need to 
curb some religious behavior that is determined to have a negative societal impact (p. 30). 
108. At a different point in Culture, Carter acknowledges that, despite the "culture of 
disbelief," African Americans are quite open in their religious declarations (p. 60). 
Carter deals with this paradox with the vague suggestion that liberals (read whites?) 
have a "blind spot" when it comes to the religiosity of African Americans (p. 60) and that 
the media accept God-talk from personalities they "like" such as Jesse Jackson or Martin 
Luther King, Jr. (pp. 59-60). But why must we credit liberal permission to speak and not 
minority group insistence on speaking? Without liberal permission would Martin Luther 
King, Jr. have given up on citing God and begun quoting The New York Times instead? Is it 
possible that white God-talk is so new a public phenomenon that what some religionists say 
they are experiencing now is simply another revolutionary process in which a group that 
desires to speak has to insist on being heard? 
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freedom as a black person against my freedom as a religious person is a 
curious one. That these passages gave me pause tells me that my balanc- 
ing act, even if I could perform it, would not result in the outcome Carter 
declares.'09 Moreover, if there was a purpose to these comparisons- 
other than arguing that the white religionist has less access to the public 
square than members of these groups-it was not obvious to this 
reader." 0 In another context, Carter warns that while it is appropriate to 
speak of oppression as being unique, and therefore in demand of differ- 
ent solutions, "we enact a terrible threat to unity of humanity when we 
construct a hierarchy of suffering, by arguing that one oppression is 
109. My reaction is triggered by Carter's obviously intentional choice to take a 
comparative approach in his diversity arguments and to blur the key distinctions, rather 
than permit the majority's case to stand on its own. The essence of his argument is 
captured in his statement that "people whose contribution to the nation's diversity comes 
from their religious traditions are not valued unless their voices are somehow esoteric" (p. 
57). He offers the Roberts case as an example of what he means: 
One thinks, for example, of the Colorado school district . .. that ordered, with 
federal approval that the Bible and books on Christianity be removed from a 
classroom, while books on Native American religious traditions-and for that 
matter, on the occult-were allowed to remain. (P. 57.) 
"Esoteric" is not defined, but I presume that Carter means a voice that differs from that 
usually associated with the cultural and religious mainstream. 
Also revealing is the following comment: 
[C]onsider the fact that for all the calls for diversity in the hiring of university 
faculty, one rarely hears such arguments in favor of the devoutly religious-a 
group, according to survey data, that is grossly underrepresented on campus. (P. 
57) (footnote omitted.) 
Carter seems to attempt to advance the ball for mainstream religionists by suggesting 
that their views ought also to be viewed as "diverse". From the perspective of minority 
groups, it would seem that he suggests that if the reason for recognizing the faiths of 
minority groups is merely because they are different from the mainstream-and not 
because they are religious-we somehow trivialize the religious content of the recognized 
speech. In this way, Carter shoehorns the minority experience into the majority model 
(disproving once again his claim that the mere presence of religiosity always disqualifies 
speech). The questionable proposition underlying this is that providing special treatment 
for mainstream religious speech will result in a net increase in respect for minority 
religious speech, or at least not be detrimental to the various interests of minority faiths 
and cultures. 
Culture gives only superficial recognition to the contextual nature of religious freedom 
in a pluralistic society. Moreover, it does not explain how a state recognizing a minority 
religion for reasons of its contribution to diversity within the culture might go further to 
recognize the "religiosity" of that religion without running afoul of promoting a particular 
faith or, for that matter, how more recognition of the views associated with the mainstream 
would result in a fairer juggling of all faith group rights, minority and majority alike. 
Moreover, in a political context, Carter's analysis might suggest that state action supportive 
of minority religions for pluralism reasons would have to be matched by a similar effort on 
behalf of the dominant religious groups who make the same pluralism claims. Again, such 
an approach ignores the important differences between the majority's and the minority's 
access to power as well as the obvious argument that since they control the culture, the 
mainstream necessarily is already included-and indeed control their own degree of 
inclusion-to a far greater extent than other groups. 
110. Was gender omitted for fear of offending the wrong group? 
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worse than another" (p. 95). In light of these observations, Carter's com- 
parisons here are odd. 
As best I can discern, the reason that Culture goes astray here is the 
same reason that its discussions of the Smith and Lyng opinions failed and 
the same reason that it so casually treated the subject of liberation theol- 
ogy. Culture's "objective" model is the experience of white America and 
mainstream religionists. From that model, it attempts to extract universal 
principles, utilizing assumptions that are heavy in mainstream appeal but 
featherweight in logic or scholarly support. The unfortunate result is that 
though subject to some criticism, each side of the white mainstream gets 
a reward in Culture. White liberals can bask in the glory of their civil rights 
accomplishments and conservatives can moan that King had help from 
liberals but they have no one. Meanwhile, important viewpoints lie tram- 
pled in their service."' Personally, I am convinced that the white main- 
stream religionist does not stand alone in the shadow of the public 
square. Indeed, Culture's own careful dance around the issues of race 
and culture provides the clearest evidence against its own argument of an 
open public square on such issues. While Culture's assumptions may well 
be palatable to picket fence readers, they raise suspicions that Culture has 
weighed more heavily the political sensitivities and buying power of the 
majority than the importance of a thoughtful and inclusive debate on its 
central theme. 
At the risk of sounding more harsh than I mean to, I cannot help but 
confess that when the packaging is discarded, Culture looks curiously like 
a pitch for an affirmative action plan for white mainstream religionists, 
the need for which completely escaped this reader. If the point of view of 
this group is so grossly underrepresented as Carter suggests, it would be 
helpful to have more of that viewpoint represented in public debates. 
But if they're out there, I cannot understand why they just don't speak 
up. If the recent public political activity of conservative Christians consti- 
tutes their speaking up, why then, is Carter complaining that they cannot 
speak? If religionists as a group face economic barriers to making them- 
selves heard and to being included in society as do many of the other 
111. Culture's use of mainstream assumptions as its starting point is particularly 
troublesome to those who don't share those assumptions. The majority as a group has the 
power to transform a particular observation reflecting its own group perspective into what 
is perceived as universal truth among most within the culture, irrespective of whether the 
observation is based on reliable information or research and irrespective of the fact that 
the observation does not take into account perspectives of those outside that majority. 
These assumptions need not be proven to be viewed as universal truths; they are 
legitimized by the fact that (1) they reflect the majority's perspective, which is the 
dominant one, and therefore, most within the majority (and those who identify with the 
majority) have never thought to question them; (2) the small number of persons within 
the majority who have questioned whether their own perspective is correct would rather 
devote their energies to topics that affirm rather than challenge their reality; and (3) the 
minority as a group does not have the resources to formulate or to launch an effective 
rebuttal. These assumptions are often translated into law and public policy. 
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groups to which Carter so casually compares them, I am not aware of 
these barriers. 
Religious speech is different. Indeed, it is for that reason I believe 
that significant danger lurks behind Carter's complaint. As I argue be- 
low, it is exactly because religious speech is different from other speech 
that appeals for public approval must be viewed very skeptically by those 
who take religion or law seriously. 
B. Telephone Faith 
There is an internal inconsistency in Culture's thesis that should be 
obvious to anyone not intoxicated by the praise that immediately fol- 
lowed its publication. Relying largely on self-identification surveys, Carter 
repeatedly reminds us of the much-heralded religiosity of Americans: 
"strong majorities of [Americans] tell pollsters that their religious beliefs 
are of great importance to them in their daily lives" (p. 4); "better than 
nine out of ten Americans believe in God," "some four out of five pray 
regularly" (p. 149); and "[a]s many as 82 percent of Americans believe 
Hell to be a real place" (p. 137). Moreover, Culture informs us that religi- 
osity is not limited to those outside the political elite. Says Carter, "unless 
we dismiss as hypocritical cynics the entire Congress of the United 
States," we should believe the over 90% of members of Congress who "say 
that they consult their religious beliefs before voting on important mat- 
ters" (pp. 111, 240). Indeed, Carter says, "[w] e are one of the most reli- 
gious nations on earth, in the sense that we have a deeply religious citi- 
zenry" and moreover, "religion matters to people, and matters a lot" (pp. 
4, 8).112 Thus, on the one hand, we are to believe that the majority of 
Americans are religiously faithful (pp. 4, 8, 20).113 On the other hand, 
we are to believe that we do not hear much from that majority in public 
because the "culture" discourages them from being themselves. If only 
society would change, the story goes, this faithful majority would publicly 
proclaim their presence and purpose without fear and America would be 
all the better for it. 
But this picture is difficult to square with logic or faith. If the faithful 
are a majority, then who is silencing them? Following Carter's thesis to its 
inevitable conclusions, either the majority is caught in a cycle of self-con- 
tradiction and self-hatred or the majority is following lock-step, a small, 
unidentified, sacrilegious elite as if entranced. Are we asked to believe 
that a mainstream majority with a mandate from an authority they deem 
112. Carter's figures come primarily from George Gallup, Jr. & Jim Castelli, The 
People's Religion: American Faith in the 90's (1989) and George Gallup,Jr. & SarahJones, 
100 Questions and Answers: Religion in America (1989). Sometimes Carter uses the 
phrase "tens of millions" in describing the devout (pp. 15, 67). 
113. I accept Carter's implicit assertion that faith is a universal concept that has a 
consistent meaning, i.e., commitment throughout religious cultures. However, in terms of 
how faith is demonstrated, contextually speaking, his conclusions about faith are rooted in 
both Christian and majoritarian assumptions. 
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higher than the Supreme Court declines to speak or act for fear that 
people might ridicule them or not take them seriously?"14 
Culture's argument-that the faithful do not speak because religious 
speech is viewed as unacceptable-has a dangerous underlying premise: 
that faithfulness should be determined by secular rules. At the slightest 
incremental increase in inconvenience, the balance tilts in favor of blam- 
ing someone else for the faithful's failure to acknowledge their sentience 
in public."15 Proceeding on this premise, Culture undermines what could 
have been its most important contribution to the religion debate. That 
contribution would have been that religion matters. But how can anyone 
seriously say that a faith that cannot withstand verbal opposition "matters" 
to its adherents? How can such a "faith" sincerely claim, as Culture does, 
distinction from "ordinary" speech under the First Amendment?"16 
Moreover, the number of religious persons is not relevant to Culture's 
analysis. In other words, if the numbers of religiously devout are actually 
lower than Carter suggests, even much lower, theoretically speaking, 
would their rights to religious freedom under the Constitution be any less 
important? But without serving up such numbers, would Carter have 
been able to get a broader public's attention? 
By buying into marketplace economics, Culture avoids facing some 
hard facts. The first is that now that religion and the state have been 
disentangled, now that the state does not compel or explicitly encourage 
a particular faith choice, or even a faith choice at all, large numbers of 
114. Carter himself notes, "Anyone who believes deeply is a potential martyr, for 
belief always entails a bedrock principle that will not yield" (p. 42). 
115. For aJudeo-Christian view, see, e.g., Exodus 16:28 ("'How long will you refuse 
to keep my commands and my instructions?' "); Exodus 20:3 ("'You shall have no other 
Gods before me.' "); Leviticus 26:14-46 (punishment that will come to Israel for 
disobedience); Psalm 81:13-14 (" 'If my people would but listen to me, if Israel would 
follow my ways, how quickly would I subdue their enemies. . . .' "); Jeremiah 2:1-25 
(lamenting Israel's abandonment of God); Mark 7:8 ("'You have let go of the commands 
of God and are holding on to the traditions of men.' "); Luke 9:26 (" 'If anyone is ashamed 
of me and my words, the Son of Man will be ashamed of him when he comes in his glory 
and in the glory of the Father and of the holy angels.' "); Luke 12:9 (" 'But he who disowns 
me before men will be disowned before the angels of God.' "); 2 Timothy 1:8 ("'So do not 
be ashamed to testify about our Lord. . . .' ") (New International). 
116. Even the polls relied upon by Carter, which are, of course, dominated by 
participants adhering to white mainstream faiths, raise similar questions. For example, 100 
Questions and Answers: Religion in America noted that of the Christians or Jews polled, only 
four in ten reported attending religious services regularly. See Gallup & Jones, supra note 
112, at 72, 120. While one could argue that attendance should not be a litmus test, such 
evidence certainly would support a conclusion of religiosity. Furthermore, the authors 
reported that knowledge of the Bible among self-described Christian participants was 
"meager." Id. at 42 (only 42% could name five of the ten commandments, only 46% could 
name first four gospels in New Testament and only 42% knew that Jesus delivered the 
Sermon on the Mount). In 1987, only 18% of Americans across age and sex lines were 
willing to state that the term "religious person" was a perfect description of themselves. Id. 
at 182. One must be careful not to overlook the questions raised by such inconsistencies. 
See id. at 42. 
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the mainstream faithful who holler out "religious!" in private responses to 
computer-generated telephone calls strike a secular pose in public when 
not accompanied by a crowd. These telefaithful jettison religion publicly 
and sometimes privately in the face of opposition or inconvenience. 
Given a choice between the rewards of "Godliness" and the rewards of 
worldliness, the telefaithful are in a quandary. They want both."17 That 
choice is the religious person's right, indeed, that right is protected by 
the First Amendment, but each such choice narrows any practical dis- 
tance that exists between religious speech and other speech. One cannot 
claim in private that religion matters, act in public as if it does not, and 
then blame the culture for one's transgressions. In the end, it is not the 
culture of disbelief that Carter describes but rather the culture of 
comfort."18 
On the other hand, it would be wrong to charge publicly faithful 
religionists with vicarious liability for how the telefaithful behave. 
Whether or not liberals previously accepted God-talk does not matter. 
Whether the number of the publicly religious is two thousand or two hun- 
dred million should not matter. They have a right to speak. But that 
right does not preclude opposition and, certainly where mainstream 
faiths are concerned, much of what Carter defines as trivialization is, in 
117. At least two studies published about the same time as Culture have suggested in 
the face of criticism that claims of religiosity are poor predictors of practice. A research 
group from New York University tested the oft-reported thesis that 40% of Americans 
attend church weekly, comparing claims against actual attendance. They concluded that 
among Protestants and Catholics church attendance is roughly one-half of the levels 
reported by Gallup and other polls. See C. Kirk Hadaway et al., What the Polls Don't 
Show: A Closer Look At U.S. Church Attendance, 58 Am. Soc. Rev. 741, 742, 748 (1993). 
Focusing on one Ohio county for Protestants and 18 Catholic dioceses, the NYU study 
lacked the geographical diversity that would provide assurance of the national 
applicability; nevertheless, the authors viewed the uniformity of the results found in the 
selected areas as significant. See id. at 750. 
A second recently published study surveying 4,001 Americans concluded that, using 
fairly stringent tests, only about 19% of adult Americans regularly practice their religion. 
In evaluating Protestants, for example, the study considered church attendance, 
membership in denominations, frequency of prayer, belief in life after death, and ranking 
of the importance of religion in their lives. The study also found that levels of religious 
commitment made a difference in viewpoints on moral issues but resulted in less 
differences in social issues. See Kenneth L. Woodward, The Rites of Americans, Newsweek, 
Nov. 29, 1993, at 80, 82. 
Hadaway, Marler and Chaves noted "social desirability" factors as one possible reason 
for the wide gap found in reporting and attendance. "If survey respondents view regular 
church activity as normative or view infrequent church attendance as deviant, they may be 
inclined to overreport their attendance." Hadaway et al., supra, at 748-49. They noted a 
parallel to the inflation found in self-identification studies on voting. Habitually, the 
number of persons who identify themselves as having voted significantly outdistances the 
number that in fact did vote. See id. 
118. Arguably, many members of minority groups would also take a less active 
approach to religion if their secular situation was transformed such that they were 
comfortably and securely assimilated as a group into the majority and supported as a group 
by the state. 
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the case of mainstream groups, simply the expression of an opposing 
point of view. The religious are not suffering a special oppression. 
Rather, they finally have something in common with other "minority" 
groups who seek to redefine the dominant language of the public square. 
However, unlike many of the other groups, mainstream religionists pos- 
sess the cultural integration and the economic and political resources 
(and Carter even claims the numbers) to make their dreams a reality. 
What is the point of Culture? 
Culture missed a great opportunity to emphasize for us that it is no 
coincidence that increased recognition of our religious and cultural di- 
versity has been accompanied by increased challenges to what had been 
traditionally accepted as legitimate government accommodation of main- 
stream faith practices. Religion, race and culture are inseparable. The 
religions, like other groups in society, bear the burdens and reap the ben- 
efits of the hierarchy of human beings that is our past and present as a 
nation. Historically, religious groups whose religious and secular needs 
were protected by the state perceived no need to rock the political boat. 
Their members celebrated a private faith made possible by a state that 
provided them comfort and affirmed their reality, often excluding the 
reality of others. Thus, they labeled religious activity that challenged that 
state as "politics" and not "'religion."'"19 It is, in fact, this ongoing relation- 
ship with the state that has led one Native American commentator to 
claim that "without a favored position in the secular world and its polit- 
ical and economic structures, most of what we now know as American 
Christianity would not and could not exist."120 
Had market forces not been so compelling, Culture might also have 
suggested that while the "religious" are waiting for someone to tell them 
where their "freedom" to engage in God-talk in public went, they might 
scan a page from the histories of those groups that have not had and still 
do not have the political capital to make their speech, religious or other- 
wise, "convenient" in the public square-or those whose right to speak, 
religious or otherwise, was not included among the religious freedoms 
that the "Founding Fathers" sought to protect-or of those within the 
mainstream, who do not view convenience-or permission-as a prereq- 
uisite to God-talk. It might have suggested that what the religiously de- 
vout are experiencing now is not the defining moment in the history of 
American religious discourse; at best, it is merely another minute among 
millions of minutes. Had Culture done this, perhaps then, both the 
119. Thus, one commentator has argued that many in the religious community have 
forgotten that neither politicians nor constitutional lawyers imposed the separation model 
on churches. Rather, it was derived from preconstitutional religious traditions. The 
current discomfort with the church/state balance is, "in great part, an attack on their 
earlier vision of a privatized religious life and attitude of 'forbearance' - or withdrawal 
from the political sphere." Teitel, supra note 39, at 763 (footnote omitted). The notable 
exceptions were the abolitionists and civil rights movements. See id. 
120. Deloria, supra note 80, at 216. This is an updated version of Deloria's classic 
work. See Vine Deloria, Jr., God Is Red 245 (1973). 
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telefaithful and the publicly faithful, who find consolation in Carter's 
book, might have discovered that the resurrection of religious freedom 
begins where the need for secular approval of such speech comes to an 
end. Culture suggests that religions cannot perform their necessary func- 
tions within a democracy unless they are independent of the state and 
resisting. But if those in the religious and cultural mainstream cannot be 
faithful without approval from the larger society, then they are neither 
independent nor resisting. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A key point Culture urges is that attacks on religious speech are based 
upon the fact that the speech is religious, rather than upon disagreement 
with the viewpoint expressed. But Culture offers precious little evidence 
to support this claim. While complaining about an elite that silences reli- 
gious discourse, ironically, in the end, Culture fails by virtue of its own 
elitism. 
But can nothing in this Culture be saved? The one useful point that 
does emerge from Culture is the seriousness of the injury to the individual 
and to society at large when one is prohibited from pursuing the tenets of 
one's faith. While Culture's attempt to explain the uniqueness of the reli- 
gious commitment should be applauded, its mainstream focus leaves us 
wondering what an attempt at a truly inclusive analysis might look like. I 
do not suggest that I know the answer to that question. Every scholar's 
analysis is both driven and limited by her own experiences and the extent 
to which, by choice or by necessity, she has been exposed to the exper- 
iences of those different from herself. 
This fact is an important concern for scholars who would shun the 
position that viewpoints should be ignored if they are not held by the 
dominant group.'2' When isolated members from a minority group find 
acceptance within majority culture, their degree of acceptance is very 
much tied to their willingness and ability to assimilate and to accept the 
preconstructed assumptions. The same culture that frowns on white 
mainstream dissent from that reality greatly rewards minorities who can 
affirm the approach of extrapolating its constructed reality onto minority 
culture. 
I would contend that a scholarly approach to problem-solving (as 
opposed to a political one) requires that one take seriously the effect of 
policies arising out of majority assumptions of minority rights. The result 
121. Cultural and political dissent, whether religious or otherwise, often challenges 
the self-affirming reality created by the relevant majority and a recognition of the worth of 
a particular dissent requires listeners in the dominant group willing to make themselves 
individually uncomfortable in exchange for a perceived larger good that might flow from a 
listening. 
In both its observations and its omissions, Culture underscores the need to have a 
critical masss of scholars from nonmainstream races and cultures in a position to 
contribute effectively to debates on our constitutional freedoms. 
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of such an approach does not have to be acceptance of what might be 
revealed as a distinctively minority position, but it cannot help but result 
in a truer understanding of the compromises involved and the effect of 
the choices made. In no area is such an approach more important than 
the First Amendment-unless, ultimately, we really do believe that indi- 
vidual constitutional rights assured by the Constitution should be deter- 
mined by whomever has the most power. 
Stephen Carter's perspective is certainly as legitimate for him as 
mine is for me. It is indeed, refreshing to find an African-American 
scholar who has managed to escape the majority's stereotypical limita- 
tions on writing by African Americans. 
And so, in the end, both the legal and the faithful must reject the 
explanation for the current status of public discourse about religion that 
Culture puts forth. Certainly, a part of me would actually like to believe 
much of what Culture says about the religious devotion of Americans as a 
whole. The picture it paints, of an America that takes its religion seri- 
ously, held captive by a culture that so grossly trivializes religious devotion 
that even stout-hearted people do not dare declare their faith, is very in- 
viting. Such a story, if true, would comfortably explain to me those times 
in which the world-famous religiosity of Americans does not manage to 
make its way into public discourse or public policy. Even my own secular 
missteps in a personal journey of faith could be shined up and displayed 
proudly in a new light. A part of me would like to believe that what Ste- 
phen Carter says about America is true. But I do not believe it. Not for 
one minute. For me, the most convincing evidence that Culture does lit- 
tle to advance the ball beyond where we are is its amazing popularity, 
despite its gaping logical chasms. We are conformists looking for easy, 
convenient, answers. The Culture of Disbelief gives us just that. 
